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Strategies of Difference: Litigating for Women's
Rights in a Man's World
David Cole*
"We ask no favors for our sex. All we ask of our brethren is
that they take their feet off our necks."
-- Sarah Grimke, quoted by Ruth Ginsburg
in Brief for Appellants in Kahn v. Shevin
"Women's situation offers no outside to stand on or gaze at,
no inside to escape to, too much urgency to wait, no place
else to go, and nothing to use but the twisted tools that
have been shoved down our throats. If feminism is revolu-
tionary, this is why." --Catharine MacKinnon
L Introductiou
In July of 1982, three members of the Supreme Court rec-
ognized a problem with sex discrimination law. In Mississippi
University for Women v. Hogan L-a case holding unconstitu-
tional a sex-segregated school of nursing--dissenting Justices
Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist each decried a result that
they saw as leading to "needless conformity."2 Powell wrote:
The Court's opinion bows deeply to conformity. Left with-
out honor-indeed, held unconstitutional--is an element of
diversity that has characterized much of American educa-
tion and enriched much of American life.... The Court
decides today that the Equal Protection Clause makes it
unlawful for the State to provide women with a tradition-
ally popular and respected choice of educational environ-
ment. It does so in a case instituted by one man, who
represents no class, and whose primary concern is personal
BA, Yale University, 1960 J.D., Yale Law School, 1984. I would like to
thank Julia Boaz, Karen Getman, and Nina Pifllard without whose friendship
and criticisms this article never would have been written. Credit for the origi-
nal idea of analyzing the role of male plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases be-
longs to Professor Catharine MacKinnon. Finally, for careful revision and
helpful suggestions. rd like to thank the editors of this journaL
1. 458 U.S. 718 (1982). In Hogan, a man successfully challenged his exclusion
from a women-only state school of nursing as discrimination on the basis of
sex.




The dissenters' complaint is two-fold; they see the Court valu-
ing conformity over diversity, while invoking sex discrimination
law in favor of a male plaintiff. Their criticisms have a certain
superficial appeal. Equality, in our society, and particularly in
our legal culture, often looks disturbingly like conformity. And,
anomalously, the majority decision bears strong language
about judicial scrutiny of sex discrimination, but involves a
man seeking entrance to a women's school, and not vice versa.
These problems, however, are hardly unique to Hogan. Male
plaintiffs have dominated the short history of sex discrimina-
tion law at the Supreme Court.4 Moreover, the law of sex dis-
crimination to a significant extent requires conformity: working
3. Id. at 735.
4. The list of Supreme Court sex discrimination decisions elicited by male
plaintiffs could serve as a casebook outline of the law in this area: Kahn v.
Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (widower challenged Florida statute that granted
widows, but not widowers, an annual $500 property tax exemption); Schles-
inger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (male naval officer challenged federal law
which mandated that male officers be honorably discharged if they twice fail to
gain promotion, while allowing female officers up to thirteen years of service
before they would be discharged for want of promotion); Weinberger v. Wie-
senfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (widower challenged a provision of the Social Se-
curity Act that provided benefits to the widow and minor children on the death
of a husband, but only to the minor children upon the death of a wife); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (male challenged an Oklahoma law prohibiting the
sale of 3.2 beer to males under 21 years of age, and to females under 18 years of
age); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (widower challenged a provision
of the Social Security Act which allowed payment of survivor's benefits to a
widow regardless of dependency, but which allowed payment to a widower
only if he was receiving at least half of his support from his wife); Califano v.
Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (male wage earner challenged Social Security Act
provision that allowed women but not men to exclude an additional three lower
earning years from computation of average monthly wage, which correspond-
ingly increased female wage earner's monthly old-age benefit); Orr v. Orr, 440
U.S. 268 (1979) (divorced man challenged Alabama statute that allowed courts
to award alimony to wives but not to husbands); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S.
380 (1979) (father challenged a Neiw York law that permitted an unwed mother,
but not an unwed father, to block the adoption of a natural child by withholding
consent); Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Co, 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (wid-
ower who lost his wife in a work-related accident challenged a Missouri law
which denied a widower death benefits unless he could prove dependence on
his wife's earnings, but which granted a widow these benefits without proof of
dependency); Michael M. v. Superior Ct. of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981)
(male accused of statutory rape challenged California law under which only
men were criminally liable for statutory rape); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57
(1981) (males challenged the Military Selective Service Act, which authorized
the President to require registration for military service of males but not fe-
males); Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (male
sought admission to the all-female nursing program of Mississippi University
for Women). See also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (servicewo-
man and husband challenged federal law allowing increased allowances and
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from standards set by men, sex discrimination law demands
that women present themselves as "similarly situated" to men
before they can be considered worthy of equal treatment.5
Powell's dissent recognizes the problems in contemporary
sex discrimination law, but not their causes.6 He laments the
loss of diversity, but fails to recognize the dangers of its reten-
medical benefits to a servicewoman's husband only if she could prove him a de-
pendent, while wives of servicemen received these benefits automatically).
The only area in which male plaintiffs do not dominate constitutional gen-
der discrimination cases involves treatment of pregnancy. See, e.g., Geduldig v.
AieIlo, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (women challenged California Unemployment Com-
nsation Disability Fund, designed to compensate workers for temporary disa-
ulity, because it excluded pregnancy from coverage under the program);
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (class of female employees
challenged company's sickness and accident benefit program under Title VII
because it excluded from coverage disabilities arising from pregnancy); Nash-
ville Gas v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977) (female employee challenged employer
practice of denying sick leave to pregnant employees and also removing all of
their accumulated seniority while on leave for pregnancy); cf. Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (plaintiffs, a pregnant woman and a male doctor, challenged
Texas abortion law making an abortion criminal unless done to save the
mother's life).
5. The basic principle of equal protection law is that similarly situated per-
sons must be treated similarly. The corollary to this proposition is that differ-
ently situated persons may be treated differently. To demonstrate that
different treatment of women is discriminatory, women must prove first that
they are similarly situated to men. Since maleness is the norm, and female is
defined as not-male, this preliminary burden is often a considerable one. See,
e.g., Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), discussed infra at notes 148-172
and accompanying text. Both the most retrogressive and progressive decisions
in sex discrimination jurisprudence start with the similarly situated require-
ment. See, e.g, Michael M. v. Superior Ct. of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 471-
72 (1981) (Rehnquist plurality concluded that young men and young women
are not similarly situated with respect to the consequences of sexual activity,
and thus that California's statutory rape law protects women from these dis-
similar consequences by subjecting only males to criminal liability); and Fron-
tiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (Brennan plurality, applying strict
scrutiny, concluded that a law which denied a servicewoman's husband in-
creased benefits when she provided less than half of his support, but which
provided a serviceman's wife increased benefits automatically, treated similarly
situated men and women unequally). The Court in both cases required a pre-
liminary showing that males and females were similarly situated with regard to
the statutes in question.
6. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 735. See also Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). In Bakke, Powell compared race and sex discrimi-
nation: "More importantly, the perception of racial classifiations as inherently
odious stems from a lengthy and tragic history that gender-based classifications
do not share." Id. at 303. The question is, whose history? Why are centuries of
women's oppression not considered "lengthy"? Is it not tragic that about half
the country's population was disenfranchised until 1918, earns today just over
half (59%) of what men earn, and is still subject to the threat and reality of
rape, battering, and harassment both in and out of the home? See Nancy Gert-
ner, Bakke on AJIrmative Action for Women" Pedestal or Cage?, 14 Harv. CIL-
C.L L Rev. 173, 189-95 (1979); Catharine MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of
Working Women 127-41 (1979).
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tion. Diversity provides a convenient rationale for unequal
treatment. In the name of diversity, society has relegated wo-
men to a separate sphere. There they are taught to be femi-
nine, a behavior that is defined by males. From the male
perspective, women are inherently different from men, and
therefore the law can and must treat them differently. Society
and its laws are structured to account for the gender differ-
ences that men perceive, and those structures in turn perpetu-
ate the perceived differences. Differences that men perceive
are realized and reified through a social dynamic that men con-
trol. Through this pernicious circularity, the subjective experi-
ence of men becomes an "objective" reality that mirrors and
confirms the male point of view, and that relegates women to a
different, separate, and unequal sphere.
7
From this vantage point, the problem lies not in whether
to choose conformity or diversity, but rather in who is to
choose. If the law's circle of masculine "objectivity" is to be
broken, perspectives that have been excluded must be in-
cluded. Inclusion of different perspectives, however, is not un-
problematic. To the extent that women today are different
from men, for whatever reason, they must negate their differ-
ence in order to be heard.8 Society tells women that they are
7. Objectivity both is and is not an illusion. As a value, objectivity serves as a
ruse for male subjectivity. At the same time, because men have the ability and
the power to conform the world to their perspective, their subjectivity becomes
reified as objective. See Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method,
and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 Signs 515, 536-44 (1982).
Men have also recognized this fact. Georg Simmel wrote in 1911:
We measure the achievements and the commitments... of males
and females in terms of specific norms and values; but these norms
are not neutral, standing above the contrasts of the sexes; they
have themselves a male character ... The standards of art ...
the general mores and the specific social ideas, the equity of practi-
cal judgments and the objectivity of theoretical knowledge. . .-- all
these categories are formally generically human, but are in fact
masculine in terms of their actual historical formation. If we call
ideas that claim absolute validity objectively binding, then it is a
fact that in the historical life of our species there operates the
equation: objective - male.
Quoted in Lewis Coser, GeoM Simmel's Neglected Contributions to the Sociol-
ogy of Women, 2 Signs 869, 872 (1977). See also Albie Sachs & Joan Wilson, Se-
xism and the Law 46-53 (1978).
8. The Supreme Court recognizes that sex stereotypes are a central aspect of
sex discrimination, but, until recently, recognizes this only to the extent that
the "archaic assumptions" that form the basis of the classification are shown to
be inaccurate. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971) (striking down
an Idaho law which mandated appointment of a man rather than a woman as
administrator of a decedent's estate when two relatives of the same entitlement
class under Idaho law applied to the court for such appointment); Califano v.
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 207 (1977) (Court overturned a law allowing death bene-
[Vol. 2:33
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different from men, but that if they want the law to treat them
equally, they must be the same as men.
In light of these seemingly intractable problems, it is not
surprising that male plaintiffs have dominated the sex discrimi-
nation cases heard before the Supreme Court. The Court has
conceptual difficulty dealing with "different" women seeking
"similar" treatment.9 It also has difficulty recognizing the
wrongs women suffer, particularly when faced with "protective"
and "benign" rationales for discrimination. 0 When the con-
tested treatment of women has an impact on men, however, the
Court appears capable of perceiving the injustice.
In this article, I will examine the effects of gender perspec-
tive on the Court's decisions by analyzing several of the leading
sex discrimination cases brought by male plaintiffs. In most of
these cases, women participated as counsel for the male plain-
tiffs or as amici curiae. To that extent, the Court had the op-
portunity to hear women's voices. In many of the cases, the
women who planned the litigation strategy purposely sought a
male plaintiff. Throughout my analysis of these cases, I will try
to be attentive to the limitations posed by a male court, male-
constructed social norms, male-conceived judicial standards,
male plaintiffs, and my own male perspective."'
Raising women's rights issues with male plaintiffs has
fits to all widows, but only to widowers dependent upon their deceased spouse,
commenting that the law was supported by " 'archaic and overbroad' general-
izations, . .. such as 'assumptions to dependency'.. ."). Thus, women must
break ree from the stereotypes before they can challenge their imposition. See
MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 125-26. But cf. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), dis-
cussed iqfra at note 247; and Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S, 718 (1982), discussed iifra at notes 248-292 and accompanying text.
9. See bra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
10. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 US. 199 (1977). Goldfarb involved a social
security provision that automatically granted survivor's insurance coverage to
dependents of male workers, but granted benefits to dependents of female
workers only if they could show that they received at least half of their support
from the female worker. Five Justices nevertheless considered this provision
discrimination against men, not women. 430 U.S. at 217 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring); Id. at 225-26 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting). That case was litigated through-
out by lawyers for the American Civil Liberties Union Women's Rights Project
(ACLU WRP), who repeatedly emphasized the harms suffered by women. For
a history of ACLU activity in sex discrimination cases, see Ruth Cowan, Wo-
men's Right# Through Litigation An Examination of the American Civil Liber-
ties Union Women's Rights Project, 1971-1976, 8 Colum. Human Rights L Rev.
373 (1976). Similarly, in Craig v. Boren, 429 US. 190 (1976), Justice Rehnquist,
despite a thirty-page Women's Rights Project brief, found "no plausible argu-
ment that this is a discrimination against females." Id. at 220.
11. The last limitation is probably the most troubling. My criticisms of the
blindered perspective of male-dominated and constructed law must, of course,
extend to self-criticism. As a man, my perspectives are also skewed and lim-
Law and Inequality
caused certain distortions in the case law. Unfortunately, given
the fundamental fact of a male-dominated judiciary and soci-
ety, a male plaintiff is often necessary for women stating their
case in court. For example, "benign" discrimination, a central
problem in the struggle for women's equality, often places
slight tangible burdens on men, while perpetuating substantial
stereotypes concerning women.12 In our male culture the
Court often sees the tangible burden but not the harm caused
by the stereotype. Male culture also obscures the dangers of
paternalism. Since benign discrimination is essentially pater-
nalistic, it is not enough for the Court, a paternal institution, to
recognize women's substantive inequality. The Court must
couple the recognition of women's substantive inequality with
a realization that it must phrase and apply remedies and stan-
dards "neutrally." To accomplish this goal, the Court must
redefine "neutral" to account for women's experience as well as
men's experience.
A male plaintiff complaining of discrimination against men
offers certain unwitting advantages. He forces women's rights
advocates and the Court to articulate a standard of scrutiny for
gender discrimination that can be applied neutrally to either
sex. For the male plaintiff approach to succeed, however, the
women's rights litigator must constantly emphasize that all
stereotypic distinctions ultimately harm women, even or espe-
ited by my gender. I face the same difficulties of empathy and understanding,
and the same dangers of paternalism, that a male court does.
I have attempted to mitigate this dilemma by reading, listening to, and
working with women who are lawyers, students, professors, and theorists (legal
and nonlegal). I believe that the problem of communication across gender
lines is greater than I can ever fathom, but I also believe (and must believe)
that the gap is not complete or absolute.
To the extent that I am able to understand and demonstrate the limits of
the male perspective, I am indebted to the perspectives afforded me by women.
To the extent that I succeed in persuading the reader, by argument rather than
unwitting example, that these limits are considerable, I will in turn be disprov-
ing my argument by my example. That is, if 1, a man, can show that the male
perspective is limited, then my example will suggest that perhaps that limita-
tion is neither necessary nor inevitable. To the extent that I fail, I may unwit-
tingly prove my argument by my example. For personal and political reasons, I
would prefer the former outcome, though the latter may be, in the end, equally
instructive.
12. See, e.g., Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), discussed intfra at notes 129-47
and accompanying text. "Benign" discrimination refers to discrimination
against women that is motivated, at least superficially, not by animus but by
paternalistic protectionism. In the typical example, women are relieved of a
duty, barred from a profession, or afforded a benefit on the presumption that
women need protection. The very term "benign" discrimination is an oxymo-
ron that reflects a radical difference in gender perspectives. Men see it as "be-
nign;" women feel it as discrimination.
[Vol. 2:33
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cially those that purport to favor women. A formally neutral
standard of scrutiny must recognize the effects of stereotypic
distinctions if it is to respond appropriately to women's reality.
The distorting effects of men's perspectives should not be un-
derestimated at any level. The history that follows, however,
demonstrates that a male plaintiff is often a useful tool when
women's perspectives guide and influence the litigation. At the
same time, the fact that male plaintiffs have proved so useful
highlights serious pre-existing gender biases in the legal
system.
IL Conceptual Frameworks-B-roadening the Male Perspective
A history of sex discrimination jurisprudence cannot be
adequately examined using traditional legal analysis. A histori-
cal and theoretical framework is necessary if we are to gain a
broader field of vision. For that framework, I draw upon the
theory and practice of feminist movements both in the United
States and France.13
A. Feminism in the United States--Developing a Theory
of Difference
The problems faced by women seeking legal redress for
sex discrimination are certainly not specific to the law. Atti-
tudes implicit in a legal doctrine that requires women to be
similarly situated in order to be equally treated pervade all so-
cial spheres, private and public. Since, in the traditional
scheme, men regarded women as different from men, men as-
signed them different tasks, such as cooking, sewing, childrear-
ing, typing, and nursing. In the late sixties, feminists in the
United States challenged these assigned tasks and roles. They
recognized the role that gender stereotyping played in their op-
pression. They argued that "gender is a learned, or acquired,
fact of social life," distinct from biological sex identity.14 Femi-
nists insisted that "differences" are largely learned and, there-
13 For this brief history, I draw primarily from The Future of Difference xv-
xxvii, 3-121 (Hester Eisenstein & Alice Jardine eds. 1980) [hereinafter cited as
Future of Difference). Eisenstein's introduction provides an excellent over-
view. Part I of the collection details some of the more recent developments in
the United States; part II attempts to capture some of the flavor of French femi-
nist theory. For French feminist primary sources in translation, see Elaine
Marks & Isabelle de Courtivron, New French Feminisms (1980); 7 Signs 1-86
(1981) (special section on French feminist theory).
14. Future of Difference, aupra note 13, at xvL
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fore, can be unlearned.15 They recognized that "different"
meant unequal in a world defined by men, so they initially
sought to minimize their difference from men.
With the growth of feminism, women gained the strength
to speak where they had been silent. The development of wo-
men's studies programs at various colleges and universities,
the affirmation drawn from consciousness-raising groups, 16 and
the insistence of working class women and women of color that
suburban feminism failed to account for their differences,17 led
to a reevaluation of early feminist attitudes toward difference.
Women's studies programs were begun with the recognition
that traditional and purportedly "genderless" fields of knowl-
edge had excluded women both as practitioners and subjects.
Consciousness-raising sought to uncover and confirm oppres-
sive social structures that had been viewed as merely "per-
sonal." It also gave women a place to voice their grievances.
Women researching and talking with other women of diverse
backgrounds, classes, and races soon began to discover and
value their differences.'8 From this new woman-centered per-
spective, women's differences were no longer simply an impedi-
ment to achieving success in a man's world. Feminism
provided a new normative base from which women could view
"maleness" as different and open to critique. Hester Eisenstein
summarizes this development as one in which women have as-
serted the right to define difference in their own terms.19
15. The requirement that women behave like ladies was a means of ar-
tificially increasing differences between men and women, in order
to keep women in their place. An important task of feminist think-
ing, then, was to demonstrate that the differences between men
and women had been exaggerated, and that they could be reduced.
"Male" and "female" qualities, the argument ran, existed poten-
tially in everyone ....
Id.
16. See generally, MacKinnon, supra note 7.
17. See, e.g., This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of
Color (Gloria Cherrie Moraga & Gloria Auzaldua eds. 1981); Gloria Joseph, The
Incompatible Menage A Trois: Marxism, Feminism, and Racism, reprinted in
Women & Revolution 91-108 (Linda Sargent ed. 1981); All the Women are White,
All the Blacks are Men, But Some of Us Are Brave: Black Women's Studies
(Barbara Smith, Gloria Hull, Patricia Scott eds. 1982).
18. See Adrienne Rich, Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and Insti-
tution (1976); Jean Baker Miller, Toward a New Psychology of Women (1976);
Dorothy Dinnerstein, The Mermaid and the Minotaur. Sexual Arrangements
and Human Malaise (1976); Mary Daly, Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radi-
cal Feminism (1978).
19. The defining of difference has traditionally been linked to the exer-
cise of power, to those who have been in a position to say who is
"different," and should therefore be subordinate.... If the nam-
ing of differences by the oppressor is replaced with, or at least
[Vol. 2:33
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The assumption of a woman-centered perspective made
the valuing of women's differences possible. Partially freed
from male-dominated social constraints, feminist theory prolif-
erated. In the United States, some focal points of feminist the-
ory have been motheringi ° reproductive rights,21 fighting
violence against women,22 and lesbianism.23 Each feminist ap-
proach questions a heretofore accepted male norm. In econom-
ics, for example, feminists challenge calculations that ignore
the labor value of childcare and housework. Within the private
realm, feminists question why men insist on viewing childbear-
ing and childrearing as inseparable.
Women's contributions to and subversion of psychological
theory are particularly revealing. Feminist inquiry uncovered a
profound male bias in what psychologists had long assumed
were neutral standards for research and therapy.24 For exam-
ple, psychological investigations of ego boundary development
in infants stimulated new theories about the perception of dif-
ference itself.25 Ego development--the attainment of a sense of
self--requires in male children a separation from the identity
of the primary childrearer, who is usually female. Male iden-
tity is thus founded upon a pre-rational separation into the bi-
nary terms of gender, and results in a positive valuation of self
challenged and contested by, the reclaiming of difference and of in-
dividuality by the hitherto oppressed, then a step has been taken
along the road to liberation.
Future of Difference, supra note 13, at xxiii-xxiv.
20. See, e.g., Rich, supra note 18; Dinnerstein, supra note 18; Nancy Chodorow,
The Reproduction of Mothering. Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender
(1978); Alice Walker, In Search of Our Mothers' Gardens: Womanist Prose
(1983).
21. See, e.g., Diane Zimmerman, Geduldig v. Aiello: Pregnancy Cassiflcations
and the Definition of Sex Discrimination, 75 Colum. L Rev. 441 (1975)1 Linda
Gordon, The Struggle for Reproductive Freedom in Zillah Eisenstein, Capitalist
Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism, 107-32 (1979); Andrea Dworkin,
The Root Cause in Andrea Dworkin, Our Blood: Prophesies and Discourses on
Sexual Politics, 96-111 (1976).
22. See, e.g., 8 Signs No. 3 (1983) (special issue-Woman and Violence).
23. See, e.g, Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Exist-
ence, 5 Signs 631 (1980); Ann Ferguson, Jackquelyn Zita, and Kathryn Pyne Ad-
delson, On "Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence's Defining the
Issues, 7 Signs 158 (1981).
24. See, e.g, Alexandra Kaplan & Lorraine Yasinski, Psychodynamic Perspec-
tives, in Women and Psychotherapy (Brodsky & Hare-Mustin eds. 1980); Carol
Gilligan, In a Different Voice (1982).
25. Nancy Chodorow, Gender, Relation, and Dference in Psychoanalytic Per-
spective; Jane Flax, Mother-Daughter Relationships: Psychodynamics, Politics,
and Philosophy; Jessica Benjamin. The Bonds of Love: Rational Violence and
Erotic Domination all in Future of Difference, supra note 13, at 3-70. See also,
Chodorow, supra note 20; Dinnerstein, supra note 18.
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as male and a negative valuation of other as female. From this
male perspective, all differences take on a hierarchical ordering
in line with the initial male/female differentiation. Because of
gender identification with the mother, female ego development
does not require such a radical separation. The boundaries be-
tween mother and daughter are considered to be more fluid
and less schematic than the boundaries between mother and
son. Thus, feminists in the United States have valorized their
specific differences and learned to understand different ways of
perceiving difference as difference.
B. French Feminism-Diruptions of Difference
French feminists have been concerned with difference
since Simone de Beauvoir wrote The Second Sex.26 De
Beauvoir introduced the concept of woman as man's "other."
In her formulation, man regards himself as the center of all
things, but requires a mirroring other-woman--to reaffirm and
reflect his self-regard. Today's French feminists, represented in
English translation primarily by Helene Cixous, Luce Irigaray,
and Julia Kristeva, also emphasize and affirm their difference,
but from another perspective.2 7 Their work draws on a post-
structuralist philosophy that criticizes traditional philosophical
notions of unity, identity, presence and the subject, and affirms
in their place fluidity, production, marginality, and multiplicity.
These feminists find that the value of "woman" derives pre-
cisely from women's historic marginalization. Because women
exist on the outskirts of man's world, women offer new per-
spectives that, by their very articulation, challenge and under-
mine men's hegemonic centrality.
The post-structuralists28 base their criticism of traditional
metaphysics on linguistic and psychoanalytic conceptions that
26. Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex (H. Parshley trans. 1952).
27. See, e.g., Julia Kristeva, Women' Time, 7 Signs 13 (1981); Helene Cixous,
Castration or Decapitation?, 7 Signs 41 (1981); Luce Irigaray, And the One
Doesnt Stir without the Other, 7 Signs 60 (1981). See also Marks & de Cour-
tivron, supra note 13.
28. The following discussion focuses on three leaders of the French post-struc-
turalist movement--all men. That the works of three men comprise so much of
the foundations of French feminism is worthy of close scrutiny, but that sub-
ject is unfortunately beyond the scope of this article. Two points, however, re-
main significant for this discussion. First, these three men may be viewed as
founders of post-structuralism as much because of their place in the French in-
tellectual hierarchy as vice versa. Second, women theorists in any field must to
some extent work with and through pre-existing theories of men, simply be-
cause men have for so long excluded women's voice. Two characteristics differ-
entiate the French feminist women from the post-structuralist men: a
[Vol. 2:33
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assert that all knowledge is produced and determined by rela-
tions. 9 Jacques Derrida terms this stance "deconstruction." 30
Deconstruction seeks to undermine the accepted foundations
of knowledge by insisting on the relativity, subjectivity, and
fluidity of language. The basic deconstructive argument is best
explained in terms of definitions in a language.3 ' The decon-
structive critic begins with Ferdinand de Saussure's linguistic
notion of definition by negative determination. "Man" is de-
fined by what "man" is not-not-woman, not-animal, not-min-
eral, not-vegetable, etc.32 These defining relations of negative
determination are fluid. Words and ideas drop in and out of the
vocabulary continuously, effecting slight but significant
changes throughout the structure. The structure is neither
complete nor static. Supplements will always be needed to fill
in and expand the language system. The very terms on which
traditional philosophy is based, such as identity and "objective"
truth, are determined and potentially deconstructible by their
negative "traces," such as non-identity, or difference, and sub-
jective multiplicities. Deconstructive method focuses on the
implicit binary pairings of traditional notions of difference and
opposition. Deconstructive critique undermines the value
placed upon the first term by demonstrating its reliance on the
"subordinate" second term. A deconstructionist, for example,
would note that, in the pairing "reason/emotion," "emotion" is
devalued in relationship to the higher value placed on "reason."
By demonstrating that "reason" is only meaningful by virtue of
its relation to "emotion," the deconstructionist attempts to sub-
vert the hierarchical ordering.
Jacques Lacan and Michel Foucault give Derrida's philo-
sophical argument psychological and political weight. They ar-
gue that traditional philosophy's drive for a unifying, ordering
meta-structure is determined by, respectively, male psychology
or dominant political forces in society, Le., white males.33 Ac-
cording to Lacan, man imposes a "phallocentric" order upon
willingness to extend the theory along radical, transformative lines; and a more
personal Investment in the theory's social application.
29. What follows is another brief and reductive synthesis, this time of decon-
struction and post-structuralism. See generaUl Structuralism and Since: From
Levi-Strauss to Derrida (John Sturrock ed. 1979) (hereinafter cited as Struc-
turalism and Since).
30. See e.g. Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology (Gayatri Spivak trans. 1974).
31. See, e.g., Jonathan Culler, Jacques Derrida, reprinted in Structuralism and
Since, supra note 29, at 154.
32. Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics (W. Baskin trans.
rev. ed. 1974).
33. See, e.g, Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection (Alan Sheridan trans. 1977);
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the world to "conquer" fears of his contingency. He does so
through language, law, and social norms. The term "phallocen-
tric order" reflects Freudian notions of the significance, to men,
of the phallus and of the law of the Father. It suggests that
such inflated notions are intimately connected to man's desire
to know and control his world. The "phallocentric" order can-
not fulfill man's desires for control, however, because its mean-
ing is determined negatively by the differences it creates.
Rigidly "phallocentric" discourse is ultimately unable to en-
compass an ever-changing, fluid world. As a result, a "phal-
locentric" world-view treats difference either by incorporation
or projection. Incorporation implies assimilation, and the fail-
ure to recognize the existence of difference. Projection rele-
gates the non-incorporable to the margins. But the center is
determined by its margins, and therefore that which underlies
the system (insofar as the system is negatively determined by
exclusion) is simultaneously that which potentially under-
mines and subverts order. Lacan's psychoanalytic model anal-
ogizes the non-incorporable margins to the unconscious, which
although repressed, always strives to return in order to disrupt
the conscious.
Foucault applies these philosophical and psychological in-
sights to various socio-political systems.3 4 He seeks to discover
how power operates in society, Le., how it transmits itself
through the rules and orders of any given social scheme. He,
too, focuses on the margins, on those who have been silenced
or ignored. He sees the margins of order as a source of disrup-
tion of the status quo.
In a male-dominated society, men define the autocratic
center that excludes or represses women. Women, to the ex-
tent that they recognize their repression, have little invested in
the phallocentric order and its accompanying notions of iden-
tity, unity, and authority. Women therefore have a potentially
subversive role-to speak up from the margins, to assert and
affirm their difference, to challenge an order that cannot assimi-
late the contradictions they pose. Women's self-asserted differ-
ence challenges a male order that has long insisted on their
silence and exclusion. Luce Irigaray celebrates the "multiple
nature of female desire and language," setting it against the
Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (A.M. Sheridan Smith trans.
1972); Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality (Robert Hurley trans. 1978).
34. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (Alan
Sheridan trans. 1977); Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of
Insanity in the Age of Reason (Richard Howard trans. 1965).
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rigid order of phallocentric desires for control, authority, and
dominance.3 5 Helene Cixous argues that since the traditional
conception of difference as "dual, hierarchized oppositions" is
based on the male/female dichotomy, women's subversion of
that hierarchy will undermine all phallocentric order.36 Thus,
Cixous calls upon woman "to write her self," to "put herself
into the text-as into the world and into history--by her own
movement." 37 French feminists, then, insist not only on their
difference, but also on the potentially radical challenge that
their differences pose to the established order. From this point
of view, assimilation is the greatest danger.
C. The Instrumental and Operational Ideology of Law
The law, from the modern perspectives of feminists in the
United States and France, is inextricably tied to maleness. In
instrumental terms, the law serves male interests. In func-
tional terms, it operates like a man's mind. The law of the Fa-
ther and the law of the courts mirror and support one another.
Law is "phallocentric;" it strives to impose order on a disor-
dered world through the dual movements of incorporation by
assimilation and relegation through exclusion.38
Feminists identify certain ideals central to the rule of law,
such as objectivity, individualism, and rights, as specifically
male. The French feminists base this claim on the foregoing
critique of metaphysics, and the function of the law of the Fa-
ther. Law privileges objectivity, individualism, and rights over
their binary opposites, subjectivity, collectivity, and responsi-
bility, and this privilege is identified with the more general
male privilege over females.3 ' The privileged terms constitute
a phallocentric legal order, defined by men's notions of differ-
ence, and deconstructible by women's articulated differences.
The perspectives afforded by feminist theory in the United
States supports the connection of man and law on somewhat
different, more pragmatic grounds. First, as a historical matter,
men developed and defined the rule of law, and thus it neces-
sarily reflects their interests. Second, feminist psychological
35. Luce Irigaray, Ce sexe qui n'en est pas un, reprinted in Marks & de Cour-
tivron, supra note 13, at 99, 104-05.
36. Helene Cixous, Sorties reprinted in Marks & de Courtivron, .iupra note 13,
at 90, 91.
37. Helene Cixous, The Laugh of the Medusa, reprinted in Marks & de Cour-
tivron, supra note 13, at 245.
38. See supra text accompanying notes 33-4.
39. Cixous, supra note 36.
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research provides evidence for the identification of such bed-
rock legal norms as autonomy, rights, and objectivity with par-
ticularly male interests. Whether due to ego development 4o or
later social factors, studies indicate that boys and men in our
society tend to be more individualistic and rights-oriented in
their moral thinking, while girls and women emphasize connec-
tions and responsibilities.41 Third, feminist scholars in the
United States have, in a wide range of fields, begun to explore
what is lost by the unquestioning assent to norms of objectivity
and rationality in academic research.4 2 Thus, feminist theory
uncovers a male bias to the very ideological foundations of our
legal tradition.43
40. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
41. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. Carol Gilligan's studies in
developmental psychology indicate that boys' and girls' moral development
evolve along separate paths. Boys, in Gilligan's findings, tended to be more in-
dividualistic and rights-oriented at the outset, regarding responsibility as im-
pinging on their personal sphere of autonomy. Girls, on the other hand, begin
with a stronger sense of connection and responsibility to others and a weaker
sense of individual rights. Gilligan assumes the end of the development in-
volves an interplay of rights and responsibilities, but her studies indicate that
women and men get there differently, if they get there at all. Carol Gilligan, In
a Different Voice (1982).
Chodorow and Dinnerstein insist that the reasons for these divergent de-
velopmental paths are socio-psychological, ie, they are due to a social scheme
that assigns childrearing to a single sex. See Chodorow, supra note 20 and Din-
nerstein, supra note 18. There may also be an important cultural element in-
volved, suggested by tentative findings of Dr. Ana Cauce, professor of clinical
psychology. Cauce found substantially more recognition of connection and re-
lations among a sample of lower-class Black boys than did Gilligan in her up-
per middle-class white sample. It may be that "individual rights" thinking is
only culturally "inherent" in white upper and middle class males, ie., those
who have the most invested in notions of separate spheres. Interview with Dr.
Ana Cauce, professor of clinical psychology at the University of Delaware, in
New Haven, Connecticut (March, 1983).
42. See MacKinnon, supra note 7, at 537 n.52, and works cited therein. See
also Evelyn Fox Keller, Feminism and Science, 7 Signs 589 (1982); Benjamin,
supra note 25, at 45-46. MacKinnon links objectivity as stance to objectification
as methoc. Keller links differentiation to the development of scientific objectiv-
ity. Benjamin's article concerns themes of rationality and male developmental
conflicts around autonomy and recognition. See also Ann Freedman. The Equal
Protection Clause, Title VII, and Differences Between Men and Women: A Cri-
tique of the Jurisprudence of Sex Discrimination (forthcoming in Yale Law
Journal).
43. Some men also recognize the shortcomings and biases of the objective
model of legal reasoning. Men generally criticize the objective model with re-
spect to race and class issues, however, rather than gender. It seems that we
upper and middle-class white men are most blind to those closest to us. See,
e.g., Alan Freeman, Truth and Mystification in Legal Scholarship, 90 Yale L.J.
1229 (1981); Paul Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 Stan. L Rev. 765 (1982);
Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 J. of Phil. and Public Af-
fairs 107 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Groups 1.
Fiss is particularly insightful about the relation between the substantive
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Implicit in feminist theory is a further critique which sug-
gests that the very operation of law can be identified as mascu-
line. The law is not only an instrument of male ideology; it
operates as an ideology. Feminist critic Susan Griffin has de-
scribed ideology as that which requires an "other."44  The
"other," from the ideologue's perspective, is necessarily an en-
emy. Ideology, in Griffin's view, holds the promise that one can
control reality with the mind: 'This is the way of all ideology.
It is mind over body. Safety over risk. The predictable over the
surprise. Control over emotion."45 Such control has been and
will be impossible, so ideology creates an "other" out of that
which threatens to disrupt it: nature, creativity, the body, wo-
men, the insane, the criminal.48 Griffin's description of this ide-
ological process resonates with echoes of dispute resolution:
Here then is another aspect of ideological structure. Dia-
logue-which is finally perhaps the form of all thought-
must become a war. One must lose and the other win.
There must be a clear victor. One must be shown to be
wrong. And therefore, each kind of thought is pitted
against the other. The listener must choose between one
and the other, either a truth or a falsity.47
The slight contemporary movement in the legal system,
away from dispute resolution models to structural reform48 or
definitions of equality and the institutional procedures of adjudication. He sug-
gests that the antidiscrimination principle may be based on the notion of the
blindfolded icon of justice. Id. at 119. Both are presumed to be objective and
value-free, insist on color-blindness, and focus on individuals and the rational-
ity or fit of means to ends. Id. at 118-28. "It is natural for the [Supreme Court]
Justices to seize upon the ideal of their craft in setting norms to govern others.
Their craft sets limits to their horizons, it influences their choice among the
many meanings of equality." Id. at 120. Fiss' alternative "group-disadvantaging
principle," however, is paternalistic in the extreme. See iifra note 50. Fiss is
not ready to give up the ideal of objectivity. See Owen Fiss, Objectivity and In-
terpretation, 34 Stan. L Rev. 739 (1982).
In essays published in 1911, Georg Simmel, meanwhile, was well ahead of
his time in recognizing the male bias in objectivity, but his solutions were
sharply circumscribed by traditional nineteenth century assumptions about
woman's place. Coser, supra note 7, at 874-76.
44. Susan Griffin, The Way of All Ideology, 7 Signs 641 (1982).
45. Id. at 647.
46. Id. at 644-45.
47. Id. at 651.
48. See generally, Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, Foreword: The
Forms of Justice, 93 Harv. L Rev. 1 (1979). Professor Fiss' notion of "structural
reform" involves a legal response to the growing bureaucratization of the state.
The traditional legal model of dispute resolution envisioned a pair of autono-
mous litigants seeking the passive decision of a neutral arbiter. Structural re-
form takes into account the pervasive role of law and government in today's
society. Structural reform emphasizes the alteration of social relations that a
legal decision can cause, and calls on judges to take a more active role to en-
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public law litigation,49 may solve some of the problems that
feminists have uncovered. The shift in normative legal models
represents a recognition of feminist ideals such as social inter-
connection and far-reaching responsibilities, ideals heretofore
largely ignored by law. Moreover, these new legal models are
less defined and confined by the ideological confrontation that
Griffin describes. But structural reform models have their own
problems. From the feminist perspective, the most important
problem with structural reform is its inherent paternalism.5 0
These models grant the judge considerable discretion and rely
ultimately on his perception of the scope of the problem. The
judge orchestrates the trial and calls in intervenors, special
masters, and the like, whenever appropriate. Structural reform
is the law of a very powerful father.
But paternalism is by no means unique to the public law
or structural reform models. It may be inherent in the concep-
tion of law itself. Insofar as law is an act of authority "for the
good" of the people acted upon, an act whose legitimacy rests
on something other than full and free consent, law may be pa-
sure that all social interests are represented in litigation. Structural reform
also justifies legal remedies that go far beyond declaring a winner. It calls for
remedies that affirmatively restructure social institutions (e.g., school desegre-
gation decrees, prison reform, etc.).
49. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L
Rev. 1281 (1976). Women's groups engaged in public law litigation include:
American Civil Liberties Union Women's Rights Project (New York City);
American Civil Liberties Union Southern Women's Rights Project (Richmond);
Center for Constitutional Rights (New York City); Center for Law and Social
Policy, Women's Rights Project (Washington, D.C.); Connecticut Women's Le-
gal Education Fund (New Haven); Equal Rights Advocates (San Francisco);
Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund Chicana Rights Project
(San Francisco); National Women's Law Center (Washington, D.C.); Northwest
Women's Law Center (Seattle); National Organization for Women Legal De-
fense and Education Fund (New York City); Women's Justice Center (Detroit);
Women's Law Fund (Cleveland); Women's Law Project (Philadelphia); Wo-
men's Legal Defense Fund (Washington, D.C.).
50. See, for example, Owen Fiss' group-disadvantaging principle, which he of-
fers in place of the anti-discrimination principle. Outlining the disadvantages
heaped on Blacks by past discrimination, Fiss calls for "special judicial solici-
tude on their behalf," asserting that the courts are to "amplify the voice of the
powerless minority." Fiss, Groups, supra note 43, at 153. Fiss never questions
the effects white men's amplifications might have on Black people's voices (e.g.,
silence, distortions). Others have been more sensitive to the problem. See
Derrick Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests
in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 Yale LJ. 470 (1976). The problem of
speaking for others is perhaps greater in the realm of gender discrimination
than race discrimination, precisely because "discrimination against women has
always been ostensibly benign,.done in the guise of protecting women, compen-
sating for their physical frailties or making allowances for their special contri-




Successful paternalism is hegemonic; it no longer looks
like paternalism. 52 Authority is institutionalized, consent is so-
cialized. Paternalism speaks for society's subordinate groups,
but successful paternalism need not speak because the
subordinate groups will speak in the dominant group's terms.
Hegemonic paternalism requires the illusion that all are sub-
ject equally to the law; the law's "punctilious attention to form"
and procedure contributes to the maintenance of the illusion.
53
"Equality" before the courts rationalizes the inequalities in the
underlying social structure.54
The existence of a critique of paternalism, indeed the very
word "paternalism," suggests that paternalism is not wholly
successful or hegemonic. Spokespersons for subordinate
groups do speak out, and in speaking, they challenge the au-
thority of paternalism. Their challenge is an assertion of differ-
ence, and therefore requires the adoption of a perspective at
least partially free of hegemonic coloring. In a study of eight-
51. See Mark Tushnet, Sociology of Article III: A Response to Professor
Brilmayer, 93 Harv. L Rev. 1698, 1724 n.107 (1980). Tushnet responds to Profes-
sor Lea Brilmayer's concern for legal advocates' paternalism by, first, misread-
ing paternalism as altruism, and second, arguing that Brilmayer's standing
requirements are no guarantee against paternalistic results. The latter argu-
ment seems sound. However, the prior misreading, and Tushnet's alternative
"barebones" approach, which affords significant paternalistic power to the
judge, suggests that Tushnet, a man, is not nearly as concerned with paternal-
ism as is Brilmayer, a woman. Is this merely a coincidence? See Lea
Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the 'Case or Contro-
versy' Requirement, 93 Harv. L Rev. 297 (1979).
52. On hegemony, see Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks
of Antonio Gramsci at 181-82, 195-96, 246-50 (Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Smith
trans. 1971). Gramsci defines hegemony as a union of political, intellectual, eco-
nomic, and moral aims within a social fabric. Successful hegemony, in Gram-
sci's conception, is teleological, Le., defined by its end state, but the process to
the end is all-important. He distinguishes two paths to hegemony: (1) trans-
formism, which envisions an assimilation of subordinate allied classes into the
dominant one, and (2) expansive hegemony, requiring an active consensus, ar-
ticulating the subordinate classes' interests in such a way as to promote their
full development. See Chantal Moufe, Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci in
Gramsd and Marxist Theory 168, 182-83 (Chantal Moufe ed. 1979). It is interest-
ing that the latter definition has more or less dropped out, and hegemony, as
generally used today, refers only to the former, more paternalistic concept. See,
e.g., Eugene Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made, ch. 2
(1974); MacKinnon, supra note 7, at 537 ("Aperspectivity is revealed as a strat-
egy of male hegemony"); Diane Polan, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy
in The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique 298-300 (David Kairys ed. 1982).
53. Douglas Hay, Property, Authority and the Criminal Law in Albion's Fatal
Tree (E.P. Thompson ed. 1975), excerpted in Robert Cover & Owen Fiss, The
Structure of Procedure 451, 456 (1979). See also Sachs and Wilson, supra note
7.
54. Sachs and Wilson, supra note 7, at 52.
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eenth century English peasants, historian Douglas Hay has
documented how the paternalistic ideology of 'Justice" can re-
veal itself when close personal ties are broken.55 In eighteenth
century England, the ties were remnants of feudalism; today,
the ties that are loosening are those of the family.
The articulation of difference, and the rejection of legal pa-
ternalism, are simultaneously signs and causes of social
change. A second English historical example demonstrates the
transformative power of disruptive challenges to hegemony.
Before 1921, the British judiciary had consistently barred wo-
men from political and professional office. It did so by refusing
to include women in the definition of "persons."56 The law al-
lowed only "persons of full age" to hold office or be solicitors,
and women, the courts consistently ruled, were not "persons."
Women's response to being defined out of "personhood" dem-
onstrates dramatically how the assertion of difference disrupts
paternalism. Suffragette women, challenging the notion that a
male judiciary could act impartially, refused to play by the
rules, and "hurled books, chairs, shoes and ink-bottles at the
magistrates."5 7 In 1929, the law was amended, and women be-
came "persons."
From the feminist perspective, law is identifiably male, in
55. They had come to London from the country, and in doing so left
behind the close and persisting personal relationships that still
characterized much of English society. And it was in such intimate
dealings of fear and gratitude that much of the ideology of justice
was realized. Some historians have suggested that "urban aliena-
tion" accounts for London disorder and crime in the eighteenth
century. It may be more correct to say that the instruments of con-
trol there were weaker, in part because the class relationships that
fostered deference were. Resistance to the law, disrespect for its
majesty, scorn for its justice were greater. Equally, judicial mercy
in London was more often a bureaucratic lottery than a convincing
expression of paternalism.
Hay, supra note 53, at 461.
56. Sachs and Wilson, supra note 7, at 12-45.
57. Scores of suffragette women indicated by their conduct in court
that, to put it at its politest, they had withdrawn any legitimacy
which they might formerly have accorded the judiciary. They
shouted till they were hoarse, and some when they could shout no
more hurled books, chairs, shoes and ink-bottles at the magis-
trates.... They were deliberately disputing the notion that where
women were challenging the dominion of men, they could expect
male judges, lawyers, policemen, prison officers and doctors to
function impartially. The women declared in word and action that
they would not be bound by a constitution that refused to accord to
them the status of being persons in public life. To submit to being
tried by a body established by the constitution was to concede its
legitimacy in advance. The issue was whether men should decide




its implicit substantive norms, its adversarial operation, and its
paternalistic remedies. The law reflects male "value judg-
ments" so deeply and pervasively that male values begin to
look like neutral normative standards. The feminist perspec-
tive exposes the substance and procedure of law as inherently
male-biased. A feminist critique articulates standards from a
woman's point of view, and in so doing, undermines the law's
illusion of objectivity.
D. Contemporary Women's Perspectives on Sex
Discrimination Law
The woman's point of view does not stop at the level of
systematic critique set forth in the preceding section. It cannot
afford to stop there. Mere criticism affirms by negation the
foundation of the object of criticism. Moreover, (some) women
have everything to gain through the creation of alternatives to
the present hierarchical systemn.5 Thus, many legal commenta-
tors have recently attempted to define a "feminist jurispru-
dence,"-a model for equality that accounts for women's point
of view without negating its difference. They have presented
new perspectives on the wrongs that society and its laws inflict
upon women. These perspectives suggest new solutions to
such important wrongs as sexist stereotypes, 59 pregnancy dis-
crimination,60 rape laws,61 employment discrimination,6 2 sexual
harassment, 3 and discrimination in athletics.e 4 Their alterna-
tives are far from monolithic. Indeed, the women's movement's
emphasis on difference is antithetical to monolithic solutions.
6 5
58. Other women, because of their position in the hierarchy relative to other
races and classes, have an investment in at least part of the unequal status
quo. Thus, the class of women is problematically united-Phyllis Schlafly and
Andrea Dworkin coexist uneasily. See Andrea Dworkin, Right-Wing Women
(1983).
59. Nadine Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place: Stereotypes Per Se as a
Form ofEmployment Discrimination, 21 B.C.L Rev. 345 (1980).
60. Ann Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 Ind. L.J. 375 (1981); see
generally, Nadine Taub, Symposium on Reproductive Rights: the Emerging Is-
sues, 7 Women's Rts. L Rep. 169 (1982).
61. Catharine MacKinnon, Feminisn, Marxism, Method, and the State: To-
ward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 Signs 635, 643-55 (1983).
62. Taub, supra note 59; Note, Toward a Redefinition of Sexual Equality, 95
Harv. L Rev. 487 (1981); Kathryn Powers, Sex Segregation and the Ambivalent
Directions of Sex Discrimination Law, 1979 Wis. L Rev. 55 (1979).
63. MacKinnon, supra note 6; Nadine Taub, Book Review, 80 Colum. L Rev.
1686 (1980) (reviewing Catharine MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working
Women (1979)).
64. Lyn Lemaire, Women and Athletics: Toward a Physicality Perspective, 5
Harv. Women's LJ. 121 (1982).
65. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text. A monolith is by definition
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Still, these commentators share some common ground. Each
argues that the prevailing male legal standards fail to address
the specific problems of women. Each insists that objective
and formal judicial definitions of equality are not generic but
gendered. In the place of prevailing judicial definitions, they
offer notions of equality that focus on participatory values
rather than individualistic ideals. They offer notions of equality
that emphasize the interdependence of women and men in this
society. 6 They demand that the law accommodate those bio-
logical differences that do exist between women and men, but
they remain wary of the law's ability to accommodate biological
differences without perpetuating socially imposed "other-
ness."6T Finally, each insists that the law recognize women's
substantive claims of inequality, but expresses concern that
the law's recognition of discrimination in one sphere may only
perpetuate paternalism in another.6 8
The spectre of paternalism seems almost inescapable. If
the law fails to recognize women's difference, as it has done in
the pregnancy cases,69 a "neutral" policy will treat women
unequally. If the law recognizes women's difference, the "solu-
tion" will likely have the stereotypic effects of condescendingly
"benign" or "protective" legislation.70 In the former case, wo-
men are ignored; in the latter, they are acted upon. The inter-
mediate goal of the feminist legal commentators is to infuse
women's perspective of difference into the law as it stands.
The final goal, though, is for women to act, as women, from a
woman-centered perspective. As long as women remain vastly
underepresented in the judicial and legislative branches of gov-
phallocentric; successful toppling of the monolithic order may require multiple
attacks from all sides. To counterpose an alternative monolith is to invite war,
and, in man's world, defeat.
66. Powers, supra note 62; Lemaire, supra note 64.
67. Scales, supra note 60; Wendy Williams, The Equality Crisis. Some Reflec-
tions on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 Women's Rts. L Rep. 175 (1982);
Catharine MacKinnon, Book Review, 34 Stan. L Rev. 703 (1982) (reviewing Ann
Jones, Women Who Kill (1980)).
68. See Williams, supra note 67, at 176-79; Taub, supra note 59.
69. See infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
70. The oft-quoted distinction between pedestal and cage, first articulated in
the law in Sail'er Inn v. Kirby, 5 CaL 3d 1, 20, 485 P.2d 529, 541 (1971) ('The ped-
estal upon which women have been placed has all too often, upon closer in-
spection, been revealed as cage."), and repeated by Justice Brennan in
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973), is a revealing choice of meta-
phors. Both the pedestal and the cage are instruments of objectification. Men,
as subjects, place objects on pedestals and in cages, so they can look at the ob-
jects. One does not put oneself on a pedestal or in a cage; one is put there by
another. In this sense, both the cage and the pedestal envision man as the act-
ing and perceiving subject, and woman as the passive, watched object.
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ernment, the problem of paternalistic perspectives will
remain.
7 1
The foregoing critique of traditional jurisprudential norms
and procedures suggests that women's rights litigators face
considerable problems of communication. They must first un-
dermine paternalistic notions of women's stereotyped differ-
ence. If they seek only to negate male notions of female
difference, however, they risk assimilation into male culture.
Moreover, feminist theory suggests that the most potentially
powerful challenge that women pose lies in their actual differ-
ence. Thus, the women's rights litigator is caught in a double
bind. Without the positions of power from which to speak and
act affirmatively, she must nonetheless infuse the prevailing
perspective with radically affirmative notions of women's differ-
ence. The historical analysis that follows illustrates one partic-
ularly consistent response to this bind: the use of male
plaintiffs to present issues of women's rights.
III. Ltigating in a Man's World-Ruth Ginsburg and the Strategy of
Perspective
A. Overview
The Supreme Court did not recognize and uphold a claim
of sex discrimination until 1971, in Reed v. Reed.72 Prior to
Reed, the courts had routinely denied complaints of sex dis-
crimination. The Court frequently cited women's differences
from men as a justification for treating them differently. 73 The
71. In March 1982, there were forty-seven women and 623 men in the federal
judiciary. By December 1983, the proportion of women had inched up to eight
percent. Susan Ness, Report of National Conference of Women's Bar Associa-
tions, Report on the Progress of Women in Federal Judicial Selection (Dec. 3,
1983). As of January 15, 1983 President Reagan had appointed 89 federal judges,
of which 82 were white males and four were women. President Carter ap-
pointed 152 federal judges, of which 40 were women. Reagan's Judicial Selec-
tions Draw Different Assessments, 41 Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 83 (Jan. 15, 1983).
In 1975, there were 10 females and 573 males in the federal judiciary, and on the
highest state courts, four of 315 judges were women. See Susan Tolchin, The
Exclusion of Women from the Judicial Process, 2 Signs 877 (1977) (figures from
1975).
72. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Reed held that a statutory preference afforded to males
as administrators in decedents' estates violated the equal protection clause of
the 14th amendment.
73. See, e.g., Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873) (Court upheld a
statute denying women the right to practice law, citing the "peculiar character-
istics, destiny and mission of woman" to be "wife and mother." (Bradley,
Swayne & Field, J.J., concurring)); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (Court
upheld a statute barring factory work by women for more than 10 hours a day,
citing differences between men and women in physical strength, duties, capac-
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legal situation in the late sixties and early seventies mirrored
the social framework; men saw women as different from men,
and men's laws kept women different from men. Feminists rec-
ognized this reality in formulating their legal strategies. Their
predominant goal was to minimize the perceived differences
between the sexes, and to show that many of the differences
that did exist were not biologically inherent but were instead
socially learned through sex stereotyping.
Ruth Bader Ginsburg orchestrated much of this strategy
at the Supreme Court level through her role as director of the
American Civil Liberties Union Women's Rights Project (ACLU
WRP).74 Ginsburg and the Women's Rights Project contributed
to nearly every sex discrimination case decided by the Court
during the seventies. Ginsburg sought to educate the Court
about the insidious effects and pervasive nature of false stereo-
types that labeled women and men as inherently different.
Since she perceived her strategy as one of minimizing any dif-
ferences between the sexes, she could make her arguments in
support of either a male or female plaintiff. Her briefs consist-
ently characterized sex stereotypes as double-edged. She ar-
gued that rigid sex roles limited opportunities for freedom of
choice and restricted personal development for members of
both sexes. 75 The sex stereotypes that she challenged often
formed the basis for discrimination that was allegedly "be-
nign": from the Court's perspective, the stereotypes limited
women's development in at most an indirect way, while directly
burdening men in a legally cognizable way.7 6 In such situa-
ity for long periods of labor, and self-reliance); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464
(1948) (Court upheld a statute that denied bartender's licenses to women un-
less related to male bar owner, noting the need for the protective oversight of a
male owner); Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (Court sustained a statute that
allowed women to be placed on a jury list only if the woman specifically re-
quested to be on the list, noting that "woman is still to be regarded as the
center of home and family life").
74. See Cowan, supra note 10, at 384. In most cases, Ginsburg and the Wo-
men's Rights Project acted as either plaintiff's counsel or amicus curiae. Id. at
374.
75. Ruth Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. Cin. L Rev. 1, 22 (1975);
Ruth Ginsburg, Sex and Unequal Protection: Men and Women as Victims, 11 J.
Fain. L. 347, 358-362 (1971).
76. Sometimes both of these considerations were relevant. Ruth Cowan re-
ports in her discussion of the Women's Rights Project's handling of Frontiero,
Wiesenfeld, and Goldfarb
[nlot irrelevantly, they attacked a stereotype with an attractive of-
fer of benefits for men. The purpose of these issues, the WRP
claimed, was to show that the real issue was not a narrow women's
rights question, but a question about people's freedom to organize
their lives on the basis of their own judgement. The WRP hoped to
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tions, a male plaintiff enabled the Court to reach what was pri-
marily a women's issue. Ginsburg chose to litigate issues that
she could frame as hurting both men and women, rather than
issues, like pregnancy discrimination, where the harm fell on
women alone. She sought to deny women's "difference;" this
strategy both limited her range and increased her chances for
success.
Ginsburg's classic argument was to insist that women
were like men. She sought to show that women were similarly
situated, but that society had treated them differently because
of stereotypical "old notions" and "archaic assumptions" about
sex roles. Where the Court was likely to view, or the govern-
ment to defend, a discriminatory classification as benign, she
argued on behalf of a male plaintiff. In her largely successful
effort to plan and carry out a cohesive, unified strategy, she
acted in "phallocentric," or male ways. Rather than bombard
the Court with differences and multiplicities, Ginsburg sought
to present the legal arguments for women's rights from a single
viewpoint. Ginsburg thus used both legal argument and her
own personal example to establish the then-radical notion that
women are similar to men. She placed herself in the dominant
male culture and argued to men, and for men, on behalf of wo-
men's general inclusion. She played by men's rules, and she
prevailed.
Nevertheless, Ginsburg's assimilationist method could not
address the entire range of women's rights issues. Assimilation
is most obviously an insufficient response to issues of repro-
ductive freedom. In this area, women are biologically different,
and therefore, women must be treated differently to be treated
equally." The Supreme Court apparently understood Gins-
burg's "women are like men" argument but has had much
greater difficulty with the "women are different" approach that
reproductive rights requires. 78 Feminist legal scholars, faced
demonstrate that men and women both suffer from the 'traditional
line.'
Cowan, supra note 10, at 394.
77. See Scales, supra note 60.
78. See, e.g, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484
(1974); General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Nashville Gas v.
Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
Stewart's majority opinion in Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-497 n.20, and Rehn-
quist's in Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 133-39, illustrate a long-standing feminist critique
of the law, ie., that in law, man is the measure. See Williams, supra note 67, at
175. Just as Sigmund Freud thought women were men without penises, Rehn-
quist and Stewart treated women as men who get pregnant. Analyst and jurist
alike were blinded by their assumption that maleness is the standard for all hu-
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with the reality of difference that pregnancy discrimination
presents, have attempted to expand notions of equality to en-
compass this distinctive female function, but the courts have
not been quick to respond. 79 Similarly, other less biologically
rooted but socially significant gender differences require a "wo-
men are different" approach. They require an approach that
accounts for women's differences without paternalistically per-
petuating those differences as weaknesses.8 0 Ultimately, or at
least as long as men dominate the judiciary, an adequate adju-
dicative solution may not be possible.81 Playing by men's rules
has its penalties.
Still, by women's or men's standards, Ginsburg's assimila-
tionist approach has accomplished a great deal. It has unset-
tled men's notions about women's separate sphere. The Court
apparently now understands some of the wrongs perpetuated
by stereotypical notions of "difference," as well as some of the
difficulties involved in redressing those wrongs. The use of
male plaintiffs to educate the Court was in part necessary and
in part a strategic choice. In adopting a strategy to litigate on
behalf of women's similarity and against the imposition of ster-
eotyped difference, Ginsburg faced significant constraints.
General male assumptions, such as the protective nature of be-
nign discrimination, and specific legal doctrine imposed limita-
tions upon Ginsburg's strategy.
The procedural requirements of standing to sue provide
manity. This reading is confirmed by the seemingly anomalous result in Nash.
ville Gas, allowing the gas company to deny sick pay to pregnant women, but
striking down a policy which terminated all her accrued seniority upon preg-
nancy leave. Nashville Gas, 434 U.S. at 143, 145. Thus, "insofar as a rule de-
prives a woman of benefits for actual pregnancy, that rule is lawful under Title
VII. If, on the other hand, it denies her benefits she had earned while not preg-
nant (and hence like a man) and now seeks to use upon return to her non-
pregnant (male-like) status .... it is not lawful." Williams, supra note 67, at
192-93. "The practical message to employers is: 'If a woman is pregnant, you
may treat her as you please. Once she's no longer pregnant, treat her as a per-
son.'" Scales, supra note 60, at 387-88.
79. See Scales, supra note 60 and Taub, supra note 60.
80. The most intractable problem arises where stereotypes are so strong that
they are women's reality, i.e., they are "true," at least for the time being. For
example, it may be "true" in the present day that women are on average less
aggressive and better nurturers than men are, but these are nonetheless ste-
reotypes. Such strong stereotypes are self-perpetuating, real, but most impor-
tantly, severely limiting.
81. See Williams, supra note 67, at 175. Congress recognized women's particu-
lar needs regarding pregnancy discrimination by enacting the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act of 1978, Pub. L No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (current version
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1976)). See Aryeh Neier, Only Judgment: The Limits of
Litigation in Social Change 109 (1982).
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an example of how seemingly neutral legal doctrine can pres-
ent obstacles to the litigation of women's rights. In all of the
cases that the WRP has argued before the Court, women's
rights were presumably the central concern. In Kahn v.
Shevin,2 for example, the WRP undoubtedly had little concern
for the extra fifteen dollars added to Mel Kahn's annual tax bill
because Florida gave widows, but not widowers, a limited prop-
erty tax exemption. Similarly, in Craig v. Borenp the WRP did
not participate simply to protect the right of eighteen to
twenty-one year old boys to buy 3.2 beer in Oklahoma. In all of
the cases discussed below, women suffered the critical wrongs,
but men were the legal complainants. Use of a male plaintiff
was the only way, in many cases, to meet standing require-
ments. Because the Court did not yet recognize the harm wo-
men suffered, a male plaintiff who suffered pecuniary harms
was essential. Ginsburg's approach had to be indirect.
Standing requirements dictate that women seeking to en-
join the governmental imposition of a disabling stereotype
must first locate an individual who is harmed in some "direct,"
albeit insignificant fashion. They must next show that this "di-
rect" harm is due to a decision based on the disabling stereo-
type." Direct pecuniary harm often seems to fall on men, since
82. 416 U.S. 351 (1974), discussed infra at notes 129-47 and accompanying text.
83. 429 U.S. 190 (1976), discussed infra at notes 219-47 and accompanying text.
84. The Supreme Court, in oft-criticized opinions setting forth the allegedly
"constitutional" requirements of standing, requires a showing that plaintiff is
injured in fact (in order to guarantee plaintiff's personal stake in the contro-
versy), and a further showing of causal connection between defendant's act,
plaintiff's harm, and the potential relief. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-
502 (1975); Linda R.S. v. Richard D, 410 U.S. 614, 616-17 (1973); Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83 (1968). The latter "causation" requirement, in particular, has been
denounced by commentators as a dishonest method of prematurely deciding
the merits of a turned-away plaintiff's case. See e.g., Abram Chayes, Foreward.
Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 8-26 (1982);
Tushnet, supra note 51, at 1708.
Interestingly, a secondary issue of standing in many of these sex discrini-
nation cases-the right of a plaintiff to raise third parties' rights-was hardly
broached. See, e.g., Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943) and McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). Cf. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257 (1953)
("Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, we believe the reasons which
underlie our rule denying standing to raise another's rights, which is only a
rule of practice, are outweighed by the need to protect the fundamental rights
which would be denied by permitting the damages action to be maintained").
It is now generally accepted that a party may raise a third party's rights where
(1) the plaintiff has a close relationship to those whose rights are sought to be
asserted, and (2) where the third party confronts "some genuine obstacle" in
asserting his or her rights. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114-16 (1976).
That this issue was rarely raised may be due in part to Ginsburg's success
in convincing the Court of the complex double-edged nature of the discrimina-
tion involved. It may also reflect opposing counsel's and the Court's frequent
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much of the legally cognizable discrimination inflicted upon
women is "benign." Standing rules thus require a circuitous
path to the issues of women's rights, and result in an equally
circuitous test on the merits.
The Court still does not condemn the imposition of stereo-
types per se. Instead, it recognizes stereotypes as invalid only
where: (I) they are shown to be false;8 5 and (2) they are shown
to be the motivating factor behind a gender-based classification
that directly harms someone economically. This approach re-
dresses the injury of stereotypes belatedly and indirectly. The
injury is redressed only after the stereotypes are no longer dis-
abling (and are thus false), and only through their direct pecu-
niary effect on a male intermediary. Thus, a certain inevitable
distortion inheres from the outset, because the male-formu-
lated, "neutral" requirements of standing cannot take into ac-
count a central aspect of women's discrimination-the
stigmatic and immobilizing harm of stereotypes per se.86 As
the cases that follow will demonstrate, the distortions caused
by standing doctrine are only a specific instance of a more gen-
eral problem. Distortion is inescapable when a woman ad-
dresses an area that claims impartiality but that was created by
and for men.
B. Frontiero v. Richardson-Peripheral Man
The first significant sex discrimination case to feature a
male plaintiff appropriately relegated him to the sidelines.
misunderstanding of the case as one of sex discrimination only against men. In
two of the cases, Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977), and Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), the relevant woman, i.e., the complainant's wife,
was dead. In these two cases some other woman might have been allowed to
bring suit, given the Court's recognition of the harm as the deprivation of an
economic benefit to wage-earning women because of their sex. Goldfarb, 430
U.S. at 206-07; Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 645. Still, the Court might have used the
doctrine of ripeness to bar suit by a female plaintiff.
Ironically, the traditional standing requirements defended by Lea
Brilmayer, supra note 51, as safeguards against paternalism, operate in the sex
discrimination cases to increase the effects of paternalism. The plaintiff in
these cases is generally a man who then speaks for women. See Tushnet,
supra note 51, at 1708-13. Disregarding counsel, cases of double-edged discrimi-
nation result in a pattern of vocal men and silent women. Whether any
changes in standing rules can alleviate such an effect in the context of a system
of law that is inherently paternalistic is another question.
85. Cf Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982), dis-
cussed infra at notes 248-92 and accompanying text.
86. In time, Ginsburg turned even this distortion to advantage. See discussion
of Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), and Califano v. Goldfarb, 430
U.S. 199 (1977), discussed infra at notes 173-218 and accompanying text.
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Plaintiffs in Frontiero v. Richardson,87 a female Air Force lieu-
tenant and her husband, challenged a federal statute that
treated female and male members of the armed services differ-
ently. The statute allowed a serviceman to claim his wife as a
"dependent," and thereby qualify for increased housing and
family medical benefits, whether or not his wife was dependent
upon him for support. The same, statute required a servicewo-
man to show that her husband received more than one-half of
his support from her in order to qualify for the same benefits.88
The Court struck down the statute on an eight to one vote. Jus-
tice Brennan's plurality opinion applied strict scrutiny to gen-
der classifiations for the first and only time.89
Ruth Ginsburg and the WRP played a crucial role in Fron-
tiero.90 Ginsburg's briefs represented a careful balance of bold
subversion and wise restraint. They appear to form the founda-
tion of Justice Brennan's opinion. Ginsburg played to the
Court's own prejudices, in order eventually to undermine them.
She supported many of her claims with citations to male au-
thority.91 She also appealed to the Court's masculine sense of
its own power in her exposition of the only favorable Supreme
Court precedent, Reed v. Reed.92 But her argument empha-
sized the harms that the statute, and similar forms of discrimi-
nation, inflict upon women.9 3
The male plaintiff in Frontiero played a tangential but crit-
ical role: he provided a link for the divergent strands of Gins-
burg's analysis. He suffered with his wife from the gender
discrimination. More importantly, he concretely refuted the
stereotyped assumption of the statute, that women are econom-
87. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
88. Id. at 680.
89. Id. at 688.
90. Plaintiffs were represented by two men, Joseph Levin and Morris Dees, of
the Southern Poverty Law Center, but at the Supreme Court, the WRP and
Ginsburg took an active part, writing the jurisdictional statement, Jurisdic-
tional Statement, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), and a seventy-
page amicus brief, Brief of American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae,
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), participating in oral argument, 411
U.S. at 678, and filing a joint reply brief with Dees and Levin, Joint Reply Brief
of Appellants and American Civil Liberties Union, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973).
91. Jurisdictional Statement at 7-8, Froniero.
92. Brief of American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae at 32-33, Fron-
tiero. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), held that a statute preferring men to
women as administrators of estates violates the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
93. Jurisdictional Statement at 7, Frontiero.
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ically dependent upon their husbands, and not vice versa.9 4
While Joseph Frontiero's role was peripheral, his example at
the periphery highlighted the case's central issue. The struc-
ture of the litigation thus represented a small reversal of the
larger social structure. Man was moved to the margins in order
to focus attention on the problems faced by women.
From the outset, plaintiffs' counsel directed the courts' at-
tention to the statute's discrimination against women. Plain-
tiffs' complaint identified the discrimination as burdening both
Sharron and Joseph, but emphasized Sharron's harm.9 5 None
of the briefs, with the exception of the government's phrasing
of the "question presented," argued that Joseph suffered dis-
crimination.96 The WRP's Jurisdictional Statement for the
Court opened with a "question presented" that insisted that
discrimination against women was central to the statute.
97
Ginsburg's framing of the question concentrated on both the
male and female members of the armed services. The language
leaves their spouses conspicuously ungendered, except in the
pronominal adjective referring directly to "support."98 Eco-
nomic support was, of course, the issue. The statute's classifi-
cation rested on a presumption of economic support that was
94. Joseph Frontiero, a student, was in fact dependent on his wife for not quite
half of his support. Ginsburg highlighted this in the opening paragraph of her
"Statement of the Case," where she claimed that with the exception of certain
statutory allowances, "Sharron Frontiero provides the sole support for both ap-
pellants." Brief of American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae at 4,
Frontiero.
95. Plaintiffs' complaint reads:
PLAINTIFFS contend that the distinction drawn by the aforesaid
statutes and regulations insofar as they require different treatment
for male and female members of the Armed Forces, and for
PLAINTIFF SHARRON FRONTIERO in particular, are arbitrary
and unreasonable, in that they deny equal protection of the laws to
PLAINTIFFS.
Appendix of Appellant's Complaint at 13-14, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973).
96. Brief of Appellees at 1-2, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
97. Jurisdictional Statement at 3, Frontiero ("Whether the classification ac-
cording to sex made by [the statutes], which provide 'dependency' allowances
automatically for the spouse of male members of the uniformed services,
whether or not the spouse is in fact dependent on the member for any of her
support, but which provide such allowances for the spouse offemale members
of the uniformed services only upon a showing that the spouse is in fact depen-
dent on the member for more than one.half of his support, violates the due pro-
cess clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution."
(emphasis added)). See also Brief for Appellants at 3-4, Frontiero v. Richard-
son, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Brief of American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Cu-
riae at 3, Frontiero.
98. Jurisdictional Statement at 3, Frontiero.
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belied by the reality of Sharron and Joseph Frontiero.99
The government set forth the "question presented" quite
differently.1 00 The government's formulation attempted to re-
verse the gender impact of the statute, as if Joseph Frontiero
were the primary plaintiff. The government's "question
presented" drew attention to the statute's impact on the man,
and marginalized the woman's complaint. The district court ac-
cepted the government's representation of the statute's impact.
It acknowledged that a "subtler injury" may have been "in-
flicted on servicewomen as a subclass," but considered any
such injury a "mistaken wrong, the result of a
misunderstanding."10,
The need to convince the Court that the wrongs women
suffer from such statutes were not merely "mistaken" percep-
tions required that Ginsburg strike a careful balance. On the
one hand, Ginsburg sought to introduce women's perspective
on the disabling effects of gender stereotyping to justify her
claim that women should be treated as a suspect class.10 2 On
99. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 678.
100. Brief of Appellees at 1-2, Frontiero. ("Whether statutes that provide auto-
matic dependency benefits for the wife of a male member of the uniformed
services, while providing benefits for the husband of a female member only if
he is in fact dependent on her, violate the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment").
101. Frontiero v. Laird, 341 F. Supp. 201, 209 (M.D. Ala. 1972). The district court
stated:
This Court Isic] would be remiss if it failed to notice, lurking be-
hind the scenes, a subtler injury purportedly inflicted on service
women as a subclass under these statutes. That is the indignity a
woman may feel, as a consequence of being the one left out of the
windfall, of having to traverse the added red tape of proving her
husband's dependency, and most sign~fwantly, of being treated dif-
ferently. The Court [sic) is not insensitive to the seriousness of
these grievances, but it is of the opinion that they are mistaken
wrongs, the result of a misunderstanding.
Id. at 209 (emphasis added). The district court's language echoes the Supreme
Court's approach to claims of racial discrimination in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537, 551 (1896) ("We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiffs argu-
ment to consist in the assumption that the forced separation of the two races
stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by
reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race
chooses to put that construction on it."). The district court imposed burdens of
proof similar to those placed on lawyers for the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) after Plessy. Ginsburg and the
WRP had to prove that the wrongs women suffered from discrimination were
real, and not merely the misperceptions of alleged victims. Moreover, just as
the NAACP faced a predominantly white judiciary, so Ginsburg faced a
predominantly male judiciary. In both instances, the litigator sought to infuse
the perspectives of the dominant class with the silenced victim's viewpoint.




the other hand, she had to temper such arguments with evi-
dence that showed both the reasonableness of her perspective
and the inaccuracy of the gender stereotypes. 0 3 These posi-
tions are potentially inconsistent. To the extent that reasona-
bleness is defined by reference to a reasonable man, a woman's
perspective might be dismissed as extremist. If the stereotypes
Ginsburg complained of seemed to comport with men's view of
women's reality, the Court was unlikely to find them unreason-
able. And to the extent that the stereotypes had ceased to
match reality, the Court might consider them no longer
disabling.
The issue, at one level, was which standard of scrutiny to
apply to claims of gender discrimination. The government
urged, and the court below accepted, that gender discrimina-
tion deserved only minimal, deferential scrutiny.10 4 Under that
standard, if any rational basis for a gender distinction exists,
the court upholds the classification. Ginsburg urged the Court
to treat gender as a suspect classification, thereby triggering
strict scrutiny.10 5 Strict scrutiny, which is applied to racial clas-
sifications, requires a compelling state interest to justify any
statutory racial distinctions.1 0 6 As a practical matter, almost
any classification can survive the deferential, rational basis
standard, while commentators describe the strict scrutiny stan-
dard as "strict in form, fatal in fact."10
In Reed, the immediate relevant precedent, the Court had
not decided the appropriate standard to apply to gender dis-
crimination.108 However, a number of commentators and lower
courts had interpreted Reed to require something more than
the traditional deferential scrutiny in cases involving gender
discrimination. 109 In her brief, Ginsburg noted that the prepon-
103. See id. at 8.
104. Frontiero v. Laird, 341 F.Supp. 201, 208-09 (1972).
105. Joint Reply Brief of Appellants and American Civil Liberties Union as
Amicus Curiae at 6-14, Frontiero.
106. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291, 305
(1978).
107. Gerald Gunther, Foreword- In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L Rev. 1, 8 (1972). But
see Pullman.Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982) (overturning the fifth cir-
cuit's conclusion that defendants intended to discriminate racially, because in-
tent is solely an issue of fact and the reviewing court may replace only clearly
erroneous findings of fact by the district court with its own findings).
108. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). The reason the Reed Court did not go beyond the ra-
tionality test was that the sex-based line in Reed failed even that minimal test.
109. Brief of American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae at 32-33, Fron-
tiero; Gunther, supra note 106.
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derance of authority interpreted Reed as requiring heightened
scrutiny, rather than the more lenient standard. She character-
ized the majority view as "appraising Reed as a decision mark-
ing a new direction."110 She argued against the minority view
of Reed and characterized that view as assigning "minimal
precedential value to Reed.""'1 The Court's authority, of
course, rests squarely on the "precedential value" of its deci-
sions. In Ginsburg's presentation, then, the Court would be ad-
mitting its own weakness if it interpreted Reed to require only
minimal scrutiny.
Ginsburg supported this appeal to the Court's collective
male ego with a vast array of sources demonstrating women's
inequality. She provided evidence that women were branded
inferior simply by reason of their sex,1 1 2 drew an analogy be-
tween race and sex discrimination,113 and affirmed the differ-
ence of women's perspective.1 24 Quoting Thomas Jefferson for
the stereotyped view that "women should be neither seen nor
heard in society's decision-making councils," 11 5 she provided
statistics on women's present-day political representation to re-
veal its continuing legacy."16 Finally, she sharply criticized leg-
islative and judicial pronouncements of the distant and not-so-
distant past, including a strong critique of several of the Court's
own decisions.117
Ginsburg balanced these radical-sounding claims with
scattered quotes from men who had recognized women's mal-
treatment. 1 8 She also provided statistics to demonstrate that
the improvement of women's situation no longer comported
with traditional notions of "women's place.""19 She cited recent
legislative action on the Civil Rights Act, the Equal Pay Act,
and the Equal Rights Amendment,l2 0 and noted that a number
110. Brief of American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae at 32, Frontiero.
111. Id. at 33.
112. Id. at 11.
113. Id. at 14-15.
114. Id. at 15-17 (quoting Sojourner Truth and the Declaration of Rights from
the 1848 Seneca Falls Women's Rights Convention).
115. Id. at 11.
116. Id. at 18.
117. Id. at 22. Some of the cases that Ginsburg criticized are listed, supra, in
note 73.
118. E.g., id., at 12 n.8. ("A woman cannot be herself in a modern society. It is
an exclusively male society with laws made by men, and with prosecutors and
judges who assess female conduct from a male standpoint.") (quoting Henrik
Ibsen).
119. Id. at 24-27.
120. Id. at 18.
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of lower federal courts had invalidated gender classifications.121
At two critical points, she used the same quotation, explicitly
identifying its authors as male legal scholars. The quotation
described the record of the judiciary in sex discrimination
cases as
... ranging from poor to abominable. With some notable
exceptions. . . [judges] have failed to bring to sex discrim-
ination cases those virtues of detachment, reflection and
critical analysis which have served them so well with re-
spect to other sensitive social issues .... Judges have
largely freed themselves from patterns of thought that can
be stigmatized as "racist" . . . [but] 'sexism'--the making
of unjustifiable assumptions about social roles solely on the
basis of sex differences-is as discernible in contemporary
judicial opinions as racism ever was. 122
This quotation bridged the gap between the radical claims of a
woman-centered perspective and the reasonable man's point of
view. Its male authors drew a race/sex analogy, focused on ste-
reotypes, and challenged assumptions of neutrality by criticiz-
ing past judicial performance. Ginsburg used the perspectives
of these male authors to elucidate and summarize the short-
comings of the male perspective. She offered the Court an in-
sight that it could not dismiss as mere women's rhetoric.
Ginsburg's strategy in Frontiero helped convince eight
justices to invalidate the sex-based classification, though their
rationales differed.123 Stewart, Powell, Blackmun, and Burger
felt that Reed controlled, but that no further elaboration or
heightening of the minimal scrutiny standard was required.124
Brennan, however, in a plurality opinion joined by Douglas,
White, and Marshall, adopted Ginsburg's position. 25 For the
first and last time, the Court used strict scrutiny as the stan-
dard for review of gender discrimination. The Court recognized
the "long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination," and
spoke eloquently of the harms of "benign" sex discrimination,
the silencing and excluding effects of stereotyped sex roles on
women, and the relevance of the sex/race analogy.126 But the
Court implicitly found these effects alone insufficient to justify
striking down the statute. Using a means/end analysis, Bren-
121. Id. at 28-31.
122. Id. at 43, quoting John Johnston & Charles Knapp, Sex Discrimination By
Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U. L REV. 675, 676 (1971); Juris-
dictional Statement at 16-17, Frontiero.
123. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 682-91.
124. Id. at 691-92.
125. Id. at 682-91.
126. Id. at 684-88.
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nan's opinion suggested that if there had been good evidence of
administrative convenience, the Court might have upheld the
classification even under strict scrutiny. 12? The opinion reads
like a brief with a fall-back position rather than a decision stat-
ing the law. Indeed, in subsequent cases, Brennan and the rest
of the Court retreated to a more lenient standard of review. 128
C. Kahn v. Shevin-Paternalism and the Plight of the
Poor Widow
In the year following the Frontiero decision, the Court de-
cided the first of many cases in which a solitary man sued on
sex discrimination grounds. In Kahn v. Shevin,129 a widower
challenged a Florida statute that granted an automatic property
tax exemption to widows but not to widowers.130 The Court up-
held the statute as a justifiable attempt to alleviate the unequal
economic burden borne by widowed women.13 1 It did so de-
spite substantial evidence that the actual motivation for the
statute was an archaic assumption about widows' depen-
dency.13 2 Women's groups, who regarded Frontiero as a major
victory, viewed Kahn as a major setback133
The sex of the plaintiff and the consequent nature of his
claim were undoubtedly relevant factors in the Court's about-
face. A man claiming sex discrimination put both parties in
Kahn in the position of offering essentially male perspectives
on women's reality. Since Mel Kahn, a widower, challenged a
127. Id. at 688-91.
128. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). For an articulate critique of
the Brennan-Marshall focus on means-ends rationality, see Freedman, supra
note 42. But cf. infra notes 234-47 and accompanying text, insisting on the im-
portance of establishing a formally "neutral" test.
129. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
130. Id. at 352.
131. Id. at 355-56.
132. The exemption was enacted in 1885, id. at 352, and no evidence was ad-
duced to suggest that legislators at that time were concerned with past discrim-
ination against women. Florida did nothing, moreover, to provide similar
protection for divorced or never-married women (see Reply Brief for Appel-
lants at 4, Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974)) and the exemption was extended
to all widows regardless of need. The exemption amounted to approximately
$15 in tax savings annually. Herma Kay, Text, Cases and Materials on Sex-
Based Discrimination 78 (2d. ed. 1981).
133. The WRP described Kahn as "the greatest blow women's litigation has
suffered ... since Hoyt v. Florida [368 U.S. 57 (1961) 1." Cowan, supra note 10,
at 391. But see MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 117 (praising Kahn and Schles-
inger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), because they inquired into the substantive
harm male-dominated culture inflicts upon women, and intimated that reme-




statute that favored widows on its face, the state inevitably de-
fended the statute as preferential treatment for a disadvan-
taged class of women.134 In response, plaintiffs counsel was
forced to make arguments on a man's behalf about the effect on
women of "benign" discrimination.13 5 In Kahn, a man chal-
lenged a statute passed by an overwhelmingly male legislature,
and both sides found themselves arguing on behalf of women.
As in Frontiero, Ginsburg's brief for the plaintiff included
substantial compromises to the male point of view. The brief
again focused on false stereotypes, but this time the effect of
those stereotypes became almost genderless. 1 36 Where Fron-
tiero was a full-scale attack on the silencing, excluding, and
debilitating effects of rigidly imposed sex roles on women,
Kahn required a concession that stereotypes also hurt men.
Ginsburg was forced to invoke an abstract idea of liberty and
freedom for the individual, rather than building upon a sub-
stantive notion of actual inequality. 3 7 A plea for women be-
came a plea for "individuals."
138
134. Brief for Appellees at 22, Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
135. Cowan, supra note 10, at 391. Ginsburg did, however, consciously choose
to bring several social security cases on behalf of male plaintiffs following
Kahn. Id. at 406-12.
136. The compromise, while considerable, was not complete. The brief con-
tained a section on the specific harm done to women due to allegedly "protec-
tive" legislation, including a footnote, which in the context of a brief addressed
to the brethren of the Court, bears a strikingly radical tone. Quoting Sarah
Grimke, Ginsburg writes, "We ask no favors for our sex. All we ask of our
brethren is that they take their feet off our necks." Brief for Appellants at 16
n.ll, Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
137. Special benefits for women such as the tax exemption here at issue
result in discriminatory treatment of similarly situated men, them-
selves victims of male sex-role stereotypes. Absent firm constitu-
tional foundation for equal treatment of men and women by the
law, individuals seeking to be judged on their own merits will con-
tinue to encounter law-sanctioned obstacles.-
Brief for Appellants at 4, Kahn; see also id. at 12, 15, 24.
138. This sort of argument is not wholly unpopular. See, e.g., Susan Ringler,
Sex Equality: Not for Women Only, 29 Cath. U.L Rev. 427 (1980); Leo Ka-
nowitz, "Benign" Sex Discrimination: Its Troubles and Their Cure, 31 Hastings
.J. 1379 (1980). Kanowitz's argument, coming as it does from a male perspec-
tive, illustrates the error of a genderless version of sex discrimination:
IA] causal glance at the treatment males have received at the
hands of the law solely because they are males suggests that they
have paid an awesome price for other advantages they have pre-
sumably enjoyed over females in our society. Whether one talks of
the male's unique obligation of compulsory military service, his
primary duty for spousal and child support, his lack of the same
kinds of protective labor legislation that have traditionally been en-
joyed by women, or the statutory or judicial preference in child
custody disputes ... sex discrimination against males ... has
been widespread and severe.
[.. I]t is clear that males have been subjected to massive so-
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Defendants answered plaintiff's somewhat abstracted
claim with benevolent paternal tones of "protection for wid-
ows."'13 9 Citing Reed and Frontiero, defendants echoed the
Court's recent lessons in the "long and unfortunate history of
sex discrimination"140 and asserted that Florida was only doing
its part to ameliorate the effects of sex discrimination. 14, The
brief, written by two men, shows considerable paternal "con-
cern" for the plight of women left husbandless1
42
All nine men on the Court accepted Florida's concern.
Douglas, writing for a majority of seven, cited statistical evi-
dence to prove that "there can be no dispute that the financial
difficulties confronting the lone woman in Florida ... exceed
those facing the man." 4 3 Douglas retreated from his support
for strict scrutiny in Frontiero and applied Reed rational basis
scrutiny. He held that the "cushioning" impact of the fifteen
dollar annual tax saving that Florida accorded to widows was
reasonably related to the state's concern for the "disproportion-
ately heavy burden" borne by Florida widows.14 Brennan and
Marshall, in dissent, invoked the language of strict scrutiny, but
accepted at face value defendant's barely supported state pur-
pose. 145 Their dissent turned on the statute's tailoring of
means to ends.146 It suggested that a statute more narrowly
classifying widow beneficiaries would pass even strict scrutiny,
without further investigation into the statute's actual purpose
or imputed impact.147 As the only woman to appear in the case,
cial and economic discrimination.... [M]en at all ages have been
victims of virulent sex discrimination comparable to the kinds of
discrimination that women as a group have suffered.
Id. at 1394.
Kanowitz's argument fundamentally misconstrues the asymmetrical effects
of sex discrimination. His approach ignores that it is and has been men who
exercise the power to impose, and, if they so desire, to change the stereotypes.
Certainly the ingrained structures of tradition make this a difficult task for
men, but to claim that we are therefore equal victims of discrimination is to ig-
nore the qustion of who exercises the power to discriminate. In Kanowitz's for-
mulation, everyone is guilty and no one is guilty. This perspective reifies evil,
and mystifies power relations. Ineffectual liberal guilt reigns supreme.
139. Brief for Appellees at 23, Kahn.
140. Id. at 19 ("Women are in an inferior economic position.., which does not
appear to be correcting itself in spite of ... legislative efforts.").
141. Id. at 22-25.
142. Id. at 24-25.
143. Kahn, 416 U.S. at 353-54. Justice Douglas declined to follow the Frontiero
plurality that he had joined 11 months earlier. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973); see supra notes 87-128 and accompanying text.
144. Kahn, 416 U.S. at 355.
145. Id. at 357-60.




Ginsburg argued forcefully that the statute burdened women
more than it favored them. Nine men claimed to know better
what women want.
D. Schlesinger v. Ballard--A Man's World
Following Kahn, the Court decided Schlesinger v. Bal-
lard,148 a case in which the exclusion of women's voice was
nearly complete. Four men represented the plaintiff, who was
a male naval officer.149 A male solicitor general argued the gov-
ernment's case.150 No other parties filed amicus briefs. In Bal-
lard, plaintiff challenged a statutory provision that required
mandatory discharge for male officers twice denied promotion.
Female officers were discharged after thirteen years of service,
male officers after only nine years.251 Lieutenant Ballard as-
serted that this differential treatment arbitrarily deprived him
of a benefit solely because of his sex.1 52
The briefs, argued by, on behalf of, and before men, ac-
corded little attention to women's point of view. The govern-
ment asserted the need to maintain a "balanced and effective
Naval officer corps" 5 3 through advancement incentives. It
counseled great deference to military considerations, preached
judicial restraint, and emphasized the "continuing national
emergency [Vietnam War] and the resultant need for a rapidly
expanding and effective fighting force." 5 4 Almost as an after-
thought, the government claimed that the differential also had
a compensatory purpose.1 •
148. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
149. Charles Khoury, Jr., Joseph Levin, Jr., Morris Dees, Jr. and Charles Aber-
nathy. Brief for the Appellee, Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
150. 419 U.S. at 499. Carla Hills' name appears, along with those of five men, on
the government brief. Brief for the Appellants at 20, Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419
U.S. 498 (1975).
151. Ballard 419 U.S. at 499-501.
152. Id. at 500.
153. Brief for the Appellants at 11-12, Ballard. Under the up-and-out policy, if
an officer was not promoted (up) within a certain period of years, he or she was
discharged (out). Ballard, 419 U.S. at 501-02.
154. Brief for the Appellants, at 9-10, Ballard; Reply Brief for Appellants at 1,
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975). This last consideration may have
carried considerable, though unacknowledged, weight in the decision. See, e.g.,
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (exclusion of citizens of Japa-
nese ancestry from the west coast area of the United States held justified be-
cause of war with Japan).
155. The lack of equivalent promotional opportunity for women in the
past, the relatively small number of women officers in the service,
and the public interest in increasing rather than decreasing the
overall number of women in the armed forces, are substantial rea-
sons in support of the differences in question.
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Plaintiff's counsel argued that the statute was arbitrary.
They attempted to show that the statute's asserted purpose
was not genuine, and that the means of implementing that pur-
pose were not rational.156 As in Kahn, plaintiffs brief rendered
genderless the issue of sex discrimination, with only a passing
footnote reference to the problem of paternalistic "protective"
legislation.157 The brief focused almost exclusively on the stat-
ute's legislative history and its operative effects.15 8 The argu-
ments were basically sound,159 but far from compelling.
Plaintiff did not argue, for example, that the statutory treat-
ment might perpetuate and exacerbate disabling sex-role ste-
reotypes already rampant in the military. Plaintiff did not
challenge the underlying basis for the government's assertedly
protective approach, the exclusion of women from combat and
most sea-duty positions.160 Finally, plaintiff's counsel argued
Brief for the Appellants at 18-19, Ballard. See Brief for the Appellee at 24-26,
Ballard, characterizing appellants' "compensatory purpose" justification as a
new argument first raised a month after the district court trial.
156. Brief for the Appellee at 9-11, Ballard.
157. Id. at 12 n.5.
158. Id. at 9-20.
159. See 419 U.S. at 511 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan adopted many of ap-
pellee's arguments to demonstrate that the purpose asserted was contradicted
both by legislative history and by the irrational operational effects of the
statute.
160. See Brennan's dissent:
I find quite troublesome the notion that a gender-based difference
in treatment can be justified by another, broader, gender-based dif-
ference in treatment imposed directly and currently by the Navy it-
self. While it is true that the restrictions upon women officers'
opportunities for professional service are not here directly under
attack, they are obviously implicated on the Court's chosen ground
for decision, and the Court ought at least to consider whether they
may be valid before sustaining a provision it conceives to be based
upon them.
Id. at 511 n.l. Ballard may not have had standing to raise the restrictions issue,
see supra note 84, which could be raised directly by a female officer. A similar
difficulty underlies Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981), a more recent sex
discrimination case brought by male plaintiffs. In Rostker, plaintiffs challenged
the men-only registration for the draft, but left unchallenged the exclusion of
women from combat positions. Id. at 83 (White, J., dissenting).
The National Organization for Women, as amicus curiae in Rostker, was
forced to take an unhappy position in support of registration, because of the
procedural posture presented by a male plaintiff. Interview with Anne Simon,
lawyer for National Organization for Women Legal Defense Fund, New York
City (March 11, 1983). Before Rostker arose, the ACLU had planned to bring a
case on behalf of a female West Point graduate, directly challenging "combat-
related" job restrictions as employment discrimination. Combat-related jobs
usually carry high prestige and salary. Such a case would force the Court to
confront directly the issue of women in combat-related positions, from the per-
spective of a woman who actively wants to assume such a position. In Rostker,
arguments challenging the combat restriction would have been suspect. insofar
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on behalf of a man who sought to "hang on" for another three
years to become eligible for over $200,000 in retirement pay and
benefits. If discharged immediately, Ballard would have re-
ceived only $15,000 in severance pay. 61.
Thus, in what was purportedly a case about sex discrimi-
nation, the Court found itself choosing between the arguments
of a government urging wartime necessity and a man seeking a
windfall. Both parties either ignored the restrictions and bur-
dens imposed on women, or used them for instrumental pur-
poses. 62 The majority sided with the government in an opinion
authored by Justice Stewart.163 The opinion detailed the
Navy's separate lines of promotion for women and men.16 4 It
noted that the Navy restricts women from combat and sea duty
and concluded that female and male officers are "not similarly
situated with respect to opportunities for professional serv-
ice." 65 The Court found that the differential treatment was ra-
tionally based on gender differences.16 6
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Douglas and White-the Fron-
tiero plurality--dissented. 67 Brennan applied strict scrutiny
and determined that the statute had neither a compensatory
purpose nor a compensatory effect.'6 8 He suggested, however,
as he had in Kahn, that a legitimate benign purpose closely re-
lated to effective means would justify a sex classification even
under strict scrutiny.'6 9 Women's experience continued to
serve as the motivating force behind Brennan's adoption of
strict scrutiny.170 But in Ballard, as in Kahn and Frontiero,
Brennan favored an "objective" review of legislative intent and
a "logical" examination of the statute's means/ends rational-
as they would have been made on behalf of men seeking to avoid registration
altogether. The National Conference on Women and the Law in Washington,
D.C. (1983) (unpublished proceedings).
161. Brief for the Appellee at 5, Ballard.
162. See Two v. United States, 471 F.2d 287 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied. 412 U.S.
931, rehg denied, 414 U.S. 882 (1973) (woman challenged the same provision
chaUenged in Ballard as burdening her ability to get severance pay).
163. Ballard, 419 U.S. at 499, 510.
164. Id. at 501-05.
165. Id. at 508.
166. Following arguments made in the government brief, Stewart also found
that the need for effective leadership and the provision of incentives in the mil-
itary context was greater than the administrative convenience rationales of-
fered in Reed and Frontiero. The congressional differentiation thus deserved
deference. Id. at 510.
167. Id. at 511.
168. Id. at 511. 518-20.
169. Id. at 518-19 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Kahn. 416 U.S. at 358-59.
170. Id. at 514-19.
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ity.17 1 It was not enough that women suffered from the classifi-
cation; the classification also had to be illogical or irrational
before it could be struck down.172 Thus, even the man who
once spoke with an understanding of women's experience was
ultimately confined by the boundaries of his own male
perspective.
Ballard and Kahn illustrate the distortions and blindness
that can result when women play little or no part in a sex dis-
crimination case. Of course, the problems would not be wholly
alleviated by the substitution or intervention of a female plain-
tiff. Without women's perspective, however, male insularity
will likely go unchallenged. Men may speak of a statute's or
policy's effect on women, but their argument is likely to be
either paternalistic or instrumentalist.
The gender of the participants in both Ballard and Kahn
reaffirmed, at the level of courtroom drama, the larger social
structure of paternalism. Men dominated the speaking and act-
ing roles, while women were pushed aside. Even if the litigants
substantively challenged notions of men's centrality and wo-
men's marginality, the presentation, by and to men, could only
reinforce the social scheme. Can we expect that a court com-
posed of men, making decisions with respect to laws that men
wrote, and facing a male plaintiff and male state, will be able to
identify, articulate, and act from a woman-centered point of
view? In Kahn, nine men discounted the testimony of the lone
woman who appeared before them. In Ballard, they barely
considered women's perspective. In both cases, the Court up-
held legislation precisely because of its alleged compensatory
effects on the absent sex.
E. The Social Security Cases--Reversing the Tide
Despite, and perhaps because of, the dangers demon-
strated by Kahn and Ballard, Ginsburg and the WRP contin-
ued to bring sex discrimination cases with male plaintiffs.
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld 7 3 and Califano v. Goldfarb174 were
the culmination of a litigation strategy aimed at eradicating dis-
criminatory provisions of the Social Security Act. 75 In Wiesen-
171. Id. at 518 n.9.
172. Id. at 511-12.
173. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
174. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
175. Cowan, supra note 10, at 406. Six cases challenged various Social Security
provisions. Four featured male plaintiffs and two featured married couple
plaintiffs, as in Frontiero.
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feld, a widower sued for survivor's benefits available by statute
only to mothers of dependent children.176 In Goldfarb, the
plaintiff challenged a social security statute that provided for
automatic widow's benefits, but required widowers to prove de-
pendency on their deceased wives to obtain similar benefits.
177
In both cases, the Court struck down the sex distinctions,
178
and rejected the same protective rationales that it had blindly
accepted in Kahn and Ballard.
179
The social security cases mark a significant development
in the jurisprudence of sex discrimination. For the first time,
the Supreme Court rejected protective justifications for stat-
utes that treat men and women differently. The Court's new-
found insight may be largely attributable to Ginsburg's use of
male plaintiffs. The male plaintiffs in the social security cases
differed in one critical respect from the male plaintiffs in the
earlier cases: they were each attached by marriage to women
wage earners who could also be portrayed as victims of the dis-
crimination. 8 0 Thus, while male plaintiffs brought the cases,
their marital attachments to female victims enabled Ginsburg
to focus on women's interests. Instead of reinforcing notions of
women's marginality, the social security cases emphasized the
interrelations of gender.
The marital intermingling of financial interests allowed
Ginsburg to characterize any differentiation as causing an eco-
nomic harm to women.'18 Conversely, of course, it allowed the
government to do the opposite. The government focused on the
benefits to women and urged a protective justification for the
statutes. 8 2 But since the statutes inflicted tangible burdens on
members of both sexes, Ginsburg could undermine any protec-
tive argument with a demonstration that some members of the
allegedly "protected" class were directly hurt.8 3
Ironically, the use of a married or widowed male plaintiff
176. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 637-38.
177. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 201-02.
178. Id. at 217; Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 653.
179. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 212-17; Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 645, 648-53.
180. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 202-03; Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 639.
181. Had statutes such as those challenged in Goldfarb provided opposite ben-
efits, i.e., had they favored widowers and granted favorable treatment to cov-
ered women wage earners' survivors, arguably to "compensate for past
economic discrimination against women wage earners," the statutes would
have placed discriminatory burdens upon widows.
182. Brief for the Appellant at 11-18, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636
(1975); Brief for the Appellant at 15-23, Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
183. Brief for Appellee at 10-13, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975);
Brief for Appellee at 12-18, Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S 199 (1977).
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in these cases also focused the Court's attention on the sub-
stantive asymmetry of sex classifications. Unlike arguments on
behalf of an unconnected male, which tend to render the claim
of sex discrimination genderless,184 the married male plaintiff
may force the Court to recognize substantive reality. Since, as
the government noted in its Goldfarb brief, the sex of benefici-
ary and insured wage earner are necessarily opposite in the
context of marriage, the choice of focus on one or the other, in
the abstract, is "analytically indistinguishable."'18 5 The Court,
forced to focus somewhere, may look to substance. In a benign
discrimination case brought by women litigators with a male
plaintiff, both sides will marshall evidence to show the relative
inequality of women. Thus, all the substantive evidence will
point towards the subordinate status of women.'
86
Ginsburg's strategy marked a compromise. In calling the
Court's attention to tangible economic harms to specific women
in the allegedly protected group, she narrowed the focus for ju-
dicial review of stereotypes to economic harm. But as she her-
self noted in her Frontiero brief, the burdens of sex stereotypes
on women are far more subtle and widespread, and are often
largely internalized. 187 An approach more radical than hers
might have sought to invalidate all government decisions or
classifications based on sex stereotypes demeaning to wo-
men.188 Existing limitations on judicial intervention, however,
made such broad relief unlikely. Indeed, as long as judges are
predominantly male, investing them with the authority to make
judgments as to what does or does not demean women, without
requiring a showing of tangible economic harm, invites pater-
nalism. Still, Ginsburg's tactic of tying stereotypical harms
only to economic burdens may leave widespread injuries hid-
den from view. For example, to the extent that housework is
184. See supra notes 129-72 and accompanying text, discussing Kahn v. Shevin,
416 U.S. 351 (1974) and Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
185. Brief for the Appellants at 13 n.2, Goldfarb. The interconnection is pre-
cisely the strength of Ginsburg's strategy. The perspectives of married women
and married men are "analytically indistinguishable" only if one ignores the
substantive reality of the inequality of gender. Ginsburg's hope was that the
Court would not ignore that reality.
186. The danger of this approach lies in the possibility that the Court will stop
at the first level of formal analysis, as five Justices arguably did in Goldfarb.
See infra note 206.
187. See Reply Brief for the Appellants at 15-23, Frontiero; see also Barbara
Kirk Cavanaugh, "A Little Dearer Than His Horse': Legal Stereotypes and the
Feminine Personality, 6 Harv. C.R.-C.L L Rev. 260 (1971).
188. Recently, in Minneapolis, an ordinance defining pornography that de-
means women as actionable sex discrimination was proposed, passed, and ve-
toed. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1983, § A. at 44, col. 1.
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economically invisible, a legal test that focuses on economic
burdens in the marketplace overlooks harm redounding to
housewives.
18 9
Given these countervailing considerations, Ginsburg's
compromise seems to have been reasonably successful. The
limited judicial focus that resulted from singling out tangible
economic harms was offset at least in part by the inquiry into
stereotypes that followed the demonstration of economic harm.
In the social security cases, once economic harm to a member
of the allegedly protected class was shown, the Court was will-
ing to examine and articulate the broad stereotypes that
seemed to underlie the classifications.19 0 Such articulation has
value in itself. It puts the stamp of Supreme Court disapproval
on widely held beliefs about women's place. Express Court
disapproval of stereotypes may cause legislatures and lower
courts to disapprove of them as well. Moreover, judicial articu-
lation of disapproved stereotypes may make it easier for plain-
tiffs to prove intentional sex discrimination.1 9 1
Wiesenfeld illustrates how a women's rights litigator can
use a married male plaintiff to challenge discriminatory stat-
utes. Stephen Wiesenfeld was a perfect male plaintiff. Like Jo-
seph Frontiero, he defied the very stereotypes cited as the
basis for the statutory scheme.1 92 His wife provided most of
the family's support during their three-year marriage, and, after
her death, he sought to raise their child himself, despite consid-
erable employment complications.19 3 In the Wiesenfeld family,
the husband and wife reversed traditional sex roles. This re-
versal offered concrete evidence that the sex-role stereotypes
relied upon by the government to justify the statute were false.
189. Ginsburg was aware of this dilemma. See, e.g., Brief for Appellee at 27
n.26, 30 n.28, 34, Goldfarb. She pointed out that because "no credit is given Iin
calculations of dependency or statistics on contributions to family income I for
the support contributed by services in the home," women's contributions were
systematically underestimated, while men's were overestimated.
190. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 645-51; Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 206, 212-17.
191. Judicial articulation of the stereotypical notions that provide the basis for
gender discrimination suggests that intent in gender discrimination cases
shoud not turn on animus but on evidence of stereotypical notions. Bruce Ro-
senblum, Discriminatory Purpose and Disproportionate Impact: An Assessment
After Feeney, 79 Colum. L Rev. 1376, 1398 (1979).
192. With female plaintiffs this is almost a requirement, especially insofar as
the feminine stereotype centers upon passivity and being "acted upon" rather
than acting. Male plaintiffs, however, need not challenge the stereotype them-
selves in order to prevail. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), where
plaintiffs were two fraternity brothers. See infra notes 220-47 and accompany-
ing text.
193. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 639.
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Ginsburg's brief opened with a "question presented" whol-
ly from a woman-centered perspective. 94 The question re-
ferred only to women, and directly linked both the spouse and
child to the woman. Having identified the women's rights issue
central to the case, Ginsburg focused the Court's attention on
three victims. She argued first that the statute discriminated
against Paula Wiesenfeld and other women, whose breadwin-
ner status was devalued; second, that the statute discriminated
against Stephen Wiesenfeld, whose parental status was deni-
grated; and third, that the statute denied Jason Paul Wiesen-
feld the personal care of either parent, simply because of the
sex of his deceased parent. 95 Synthesizing her claims, she
characterized the discrimination as "differential treatment of
identically situated families solely on the basis" of the gender
of the deceased parent. 96 In calling attention to the family and
child, Ginsburg may have played subliminally on the Court's
assumptions about the relations between a mother and her
family. More importantly, she personalized and desexualized
the harm, only to reintroduce sexuality by characterizing the
burden as turning on the gender of the covered deceased
parent.197
The Court overturned the statute unanimously. Eight Jus-
tices explicitly disagreed with the Solicitor General's claim that
"it is very difficult to fathom how an increased benefit paid ex-
clusively to males [as a result of the Court's ruling] ... can be
an elimination of anti-female discrimination." 9 8 Brennan, writ-
ing for the Court, and Powell and Burger, concurring, con-
cluded that the statute provided less protection for female
194. Whether 42 U.S.C. § 402(g), which excludes a female wage earner's
surviving spouse from a Social Security benefit designed to enable
the deceased wage earner's child to be cared for personally by the
surviving parent, discriminates invidiously on the basis of gender
in violation of the fifth amendment to the Constitution.
Brief for the Appellees at 3, Wiesefeld.
195. Id. at 10-13.
196. Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
197. With facts sV strong, and the immediate precedent of Kahn and Ballard so
unfavorable, Ginsburg decided not to press for strict scrutiny of statutory sex
classifications. She hoped to develop good case law before pushing the Court
to articulate a higher standard of review. Cowan, supra note 10, at 398. Instead,
Ginsburg insisted that the classification at issue hurt everybody (especially wo-
men), and thus did not even meet the Reed rational basis standard. Brief for
the Appellee at 13-14, Wiesenfeld. In case the Court was willing to go further,
however, the Center for Constitutional Rights filed an amicus brief that focused
solely on the statute's impact on women, and called for strict scrutiny. Amicus
Brief for Center for Constitutional Rights at 11-14, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,
420 U.S. 636 (1975).
198. Brief for the Appellant at 22-23, Wiesenfeld.
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wage earners' families than for male wage earners' families. 9 9
Rehnquist, concurring separately in the result, focused on the
discrimination against the child and found the statute irra-
tional.2 00 Rehnquist found it unnecessary to confront the un-
derlying issue of allegedly benign discrimination against
women.201 Brennan, however, entertained the government's
" compensatory" rationale. He examined the statutory scheme
and its legislative history and concluded that no compensatory
purpose existed.202 Rather, he determined that the statute was
based on the impermissible presumption that "male workers'
earnings are vital to the support of their families, while the
earnings of female wage earners do not significantly contribute
to their families' support."203  Brennan distinguished Kahn,
noting that the plaintiff in that case had made no showing of
tangible economic harm to members of the allegedly protected
class of women.204 Ginsburg's strategy had succeeded. Kahn
was effectively limited to situations of benign discrimination
without economic harm to the "protected" class. In Wiesenfeld,
the Court, for the first time, rejected a "compensatory"
rationale.
Ginsburg's strategy was less successful in Califano v.
Goldfarb.205 In Goldfarb, a majority of the Court failed to rec-
ognize that the statutory provision discriminated against
women.206 A plurality found the discrimination "indistinguish-
able" from that in Wiesenfeld, but invalidation of the statute re-
quired the concurrence of Justice Stevens, who viewed the
statute as burdening only men.20 7 The basic facts of the case
were familiar. A widower sought social security benefits that
hinged on his deceased wife's coverage. The government de-
nied him benefits because the statute imposed different re-
quirements on widows and widowers. Under the statute,
widows received survivor's benefits automatically. A widower
199. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 645.
200. Id. at 655 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 648.
203. Id. at 643.
204. Id. at 645.
205. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
206. Ginsburg's plaintiff prevailed, and the Court struck down the challenged
statute 5-4, but Stevens' swing vote, while concurring in the result reached by
Brennan's plurality, agreed with the Rehnquist dissent (joined by Burger,
Stewart and Blackmun) that the victims, if any, were men, not women. Id. at
218 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 225-26 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
207. Id. at 204.
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received benefits only upon showing that over half of his eco-
nomic support came from his wife.208 Ginsburg adopted an ap-
proach similar to the one she had employed in Wiesenfeld. She
first emphasized the discrimination against insured working
women and then focused on the marital unit.20 9 She responded
to the government's compensatory rationale by describing how
the statute devalued the economic status of Hannah Goldfarb
and other similarly situated women.2 10 She outlined how the
statutory scheme offered women wage earners' families less
protection than that received by working men's families.2 11 Fi-
nally, she noted that the presumption underlying the statute
was the same overbroad "male breadwinner" stereotype that
the Court had ruled impermissible in Wiesenfeld.2 12
Despite the case's similarity to Wiesenfeld, the Court's
earlier unanimity splintered in Goldfarb. Four justices viewed
the statute as impermissible discrimination against women,
and four found no discrimination at all. Justice Stevens, the
swing vote, concurred in striking down the statute, but on the
basis of discrimination against widowers.213 Stevens proposed
a test that would invalidate statutes that discriminated against
men when the statute "is merely the accidental byproduct of a
traditional way of thinking about females."21 4 His test pro-
posed a lower standard of scrutiny for classifications that bur-
den men than for those that burden women.21 5 In the abstract,
this seems well-intentioned. In practice, however, courts are
dominated by men who find it easier to see discrimination
against men, and are often blind to the burdens placed on wo-
men. Discrimination against women is often characterized as
favoring or protecting women, and the Court has not been par-
ticularly adept at seeing through "benign" rationales. Stevens'
test, focusing on "a traditional way of thinking about females,"
suggests that the wrong that should most concern the Court is
stereotypic harm to females. Stevens' male-centered analysis
of the Goldfarb classification, however, demonstrates the dan-
208. Id. at 201-03.
209. Brief for the Appellee at 6-7, Goldfarb.
210. Id. at 8, 34-38.
211. Id. at 7.
212. Id. at 24. The government, again represented by Solicitor General Robert
Bork, also offered repeat arguments. As in Wiesenfeld, the government focused
attention on the beneficiaries rather than the insured individuals, while assert-
ing in a curious footnote that the distinction "is one of merely rhetorical signifi-
cance." Brief for the Appellants at 13 n.2, Goldfarb.
213. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 224.
214. Id. at 223 (emphasis added).
215. Id. at 218-19.
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ger of relying on such judicial concern; Stevens was unable to
see that the classification burdened women. The "accidental
byproduct" test sets a low burden of proof for the government.
To justify disparate treatment, the government need only show
that "something more than accident" underlies a classifica-
tion.216 Thus, Stevens' approach unwittingly demonstrates the
difficulties inherent in relying on men to see through women's
eyes. Stevens saw enough to know there is a difference be-
tween discrimination against women and men, but not enough
to know the difference when he sees it.21
7
The plurality and the four-vote dissent in Goldfarb wholly
adopted the arguments of the briefs they favored, and added
nothing to the jurisprudence of sex discrimination. Women's
groups viewed the results in Goldfarb favorably, but the
Court's doctrinal and perceptual confusion demonstrated that
there is no failsafe way for women to inform men about their
perspective. Ginsburg's strategy for attacking the legacy of be-
nign discrimination had to rely ultimately on men's ability to
see discrimination from a women's perspective. In Goldfarb,
five men failed her.
2 18
216. Id. at 223.
217. In writing this, I know that I am susceptible to the criticism that to some
extent, I share Stevens' shortcomings. If that is the case--and at some level it
almost necessarily will be so-I welcome comments and criticism.
From a woman-centered perspective, Rehnquist's dissent in Goldfarb con-
cludes with an unfavorable result, but his dissent is in some ways less insidi-
ous than Stevens' concurrence. Where Stevens presumed to speak with an
enlightened voice, Rehnquist simply parroted the government's arguments.
Rehnquist counseled deference to social insurance legislation and defined the
effect of the statute narrowly-"to make it easier for widows to obtain benefits
than widowers." 430 U.S. at 225 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He distinguished
Wiesenfeld on the facts and found Frontiero irrelevant on the grounds that
compensation for services differs from social insurance. Id. at 240-41. These
are old arguments, all soundly rejected in Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 646-53, and by
the majority in Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 204 n.4. The only thing that is surprising
about Rehnquist's dissent is that three Justices (Burger, Stewart, and Black-
mun) joined it. Id. at 224.
218. Soon after Goldfarb, the Court decided Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313
(1977), upholding per curiam a Social Security statute that provided differential
treatment for women and men in computation of old-age insurance benefits.
The statute, challenged by a man, weighted women's high wage years more fa-
vorably than men's. This yielded higher old-age benefits for retired women
who had earned the same salary as men. Id. at 316. The Court justified this
compensatory scheme by examining legislative history that evidenced deliber-
ate, rather than accidental, compensation for women's economic disabilities.
Id. at 320. The Court also noted that the classification did not "in fact penalize
women wage earners." Id. at 317.
The Goldfarb dissenters concurred in the Webster judgment, but wrote
separately to reaffirm their Goldfarb analysis. Id. at 321. Thus, the per curiam
opinion is a compromise between the Stevens and the Brennan plurality, evi-
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F. Craig v. Boren--Avoiding Paternalism
It has long been considered ironic that the Court's first ar-
ticulation of the "intermediate" standard for review of gender
classifications came in Craig v. Boren, a case concerning men's
rights to buy "near-beer." 219 The plaintiffs in Boren were two
fraternity brothers and the proprietor of a bar called "The
Honk and Holler." 220 They successfully challenged an
Oklahoma state law that barred eighteen to twenty-one year
old men, but not women, from purchasing 3.2 percent beer.22 1
Examination of the parties' briefs highlights the irony that the
Boren case established heightened scrutiny of sex classifica-
tions. The Oklahoma attorney general offered an essay on the
state's twenty-first amendment right to regulate liquor sales.
222
Plaintiffs' counsel, a man, wrote a confusing, overstated, plainly
sexist, self-proclaimed "Bicentennial Brief."223
The deepest irony may be that only in such a case could
the Court articulate a heightened standard of review for sex
discrimination cases. Boren was the first Supreme Court case
in which the government justified discrimination against men
with a rationale other than administrative convenience or be-
dent here in the use of the "accidental byproduct" test. Id. at 320. Briefs were
not available for this case, but it seems that Ginsburg and the WRP were not
involved. Ginsburg has written approvingly of the Court's decision. She too
found the legislative purpose to be based on affirmative action grounds, rather
than on stereotypical notions. See Ruth Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Benign
Classification in the Context of Sex, 10 Conn. L Rev. 813 (1978). Other feminist
commentators are more critical of the Court's decision. See Gertner, supra
note 6, Williams, supra note 67, at 179 rL35.
219. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
220. Brief of Appellant at 1, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
221. Boren, 429 U.S. at 191-92, 210.
222. Brief of Appellees at 4-8, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
223. Brief of Appellant at 52, Boren. The government asserted that drinking
was not a constitutionally-guaranteed right, counseled great deference to state
regulation of "intoxicants," and quoted at length from the much criticized
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). See Brief of Appellees at 9-13, Boren; cf.
429 U.S. at 210 n.23. Plaintiffs' brief was even worse. Its hyperbolic style-
marked by needless italics, exclamation points, and capitalization-trivialized
the matter by its very insistency. See, e.g., Brief for the Appellants at 47, Boren
(comparing the age limitation for purchasing 3.2% beer to the "badge of inferi-
ority" of school segregation).
Both sides, moreover, lost themselves in a hopeless morass of largely irrel-
evant statistical studies. See Brief for the Appellant at 20-43, Boren; Brief for
the Appellees at 18-32, Boren, Appendix at A-21-A-31, Boren; Brief for American
Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae at 25-34, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976). For the Court's treatment of the statistics, see 429 U.S. at 200-04- 'There
is no reason to belabor this line of analysis. It is unrealistic to expect either
members of the judiciary or state officials to be well versed in the rigors of ex-
perimental or statistical technique." Id. at 204.
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nign protectionism. The Court found Oklahoma's purported in-
terest in traffic safety serious enough to warrant greater
consideration than administrative convenience, but evidently
less problematic than paternal protectionism. For the first
time, the Court confronted discrimination that it could easily
see-discrimination against men-without the confusing bag-
gage of benign rationales. And for the first time, a majority of
the Court articulated a new, heightened standard of scrutiny
for sex classifications. Under this new "intermediate" stan-
dard, the Court required that sex-based classifications "must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substan-
tially related to achievement of those objectives."
2 2 4
The Court received little guidance from plaintiffs' counsel.
Sexism and confusion pervaded plaintiffs' briefs. Opening the
Jurisdictional Statement, counsel framed the "question
presented" as follows: "[Wihether [the statutes], permitting
girls to buy 3.2% beer at age 18 while capriciously prohibiting
men therefrom until age 21, is unconstitutional." 225 Later, he
distinguished Geduldig v. Aiello,226 Kahn, and Ballard, in ways
that implicitly justified their results. 227 And in two footnotes,
he displayed an uncanny blindness to his own sexism. Near
the end of his Reply Brief, he noted the irrationality inherent in
laws that allowed an eighteen year old to serve in the armed
services, but prohibited his purchase of 3.2 beer.228 He claimed
that to trust an eighteen year old's "combat.disqualified girl-
friend" with beer, but not to trust him, was "nothing less than
224. Boren, 429 U.S. at 197.
225. Jurisdictional Statement at 5, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (emphasis
added).
226. 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (pregnancy discrimination case where the Court ap-
plied a rational basis standard).
227. Jurisdictional Statement at 12, Boren.
228. Reply Brief for the Appellant at 13, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (em-
phasis added). An internal reference directs the Court's attention back to the
following footnote, in case they missed it the first time:
This very fact has led to some satirical comment that the discrimi-
nation in question derives its continued vitality not so much from a
Fundamentalist as from a matriarchist conspiracy: comprised of
middle-aged mothers with an over abundance [sic] of comely
daughters of the nubile ages who would have but scanty prospects
for "dates- without the discrimination in question, but whose pros-
pects therefor are being materially enhanced by their legal monop-
oly amongst 18-21 year olds for the purchase of beer, and because
of which statutorily-invested monopoly the thirsty young men of
the same age group have no choice but to invite said comely girls
cut, so that they (the girls) can inter alia purchase the very beer
which will in turn further materially enhance their mating
prospects.
Brief for the Appellants at 46 n.15, Boren.
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insult."229 In case the nature of the insult was unclear, he ad-
ded a descriptive footnote:
One can well imagine, under the present law, the spectacle
outside the PX package store at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, of a
20-year-old First Lieutenant of artillery-maybe even a bat-
tery commander, with all the power and responsibility that
that entails-idling his jeep while his 18-year-old WAC
clerk-typist PFC runs in to purchase her CO's six-pack for
him!230
The arnicus brief of Ginsburg and the WRP provided the
solitary voice of reason in the case. As the statute placed no
tangible economic burden on women, Ginsburg was forced to
address the effect of the statute's underlying stereotypes. She
noted that while "on its face" the statute discriminated against
men,
upon deeper inspection, however, the discrimination is re-
vealed as simply another manifestation of traditional atti-
tudes and prejudices about the expected behavior and roles
of the two sexes in our society, part of the myriad signals
and messages that daily underscore the notion of men as
society's active members, women as men's quiescent com-
panions, members of the "other" or second sex.M1
While Ginsburg admitted that such "gender pigeonholing"
hurts both men and women, she insisted that the ultimate bur-
den falls on women.23 2 She also reminded the Court that men
had written the law.233
She directed the Court's attention to the limiting effects of
stereotypes per se, infused with an understanding of the sub-
stantive inequality that underlies them. She asserted that even
documented assumptions are inadequate when they involve
stereotypic "notions about the way women or men are."2 4 In
support of this proposition, she cited Reed, Frontiero, and Wie-
sen.feld, whose defendants had offered better documentation
for their stereotypic assumptions than Oklahoma presented
here.23 Ginsburg's argument in Boren thus extended beyond
the Wiesenfeld and Goldfarb focus on tangible economic bur-
dens. Still wary of the Court's perspective, Ginsburg couched
her stereotype argument in formally neutral terms. At the
229. Reply Brief for the Appellants at 13, Boren.
230. Id. at 13 n.6.
231. Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae at 22,
Boren.
232. Id. at 21-23.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 15.
235. Id. at 14.
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same time, she based her argument on the substantive reality
of women's subordinate status. She suggested a facially neu-
tral inquiry focused on gender pigeonholing but insisted that it
be grounded on a substantive understanding that the ultimate
harm of all statutory sex distinctions falls upon women.
236
Ginsburg's approach thus attempted to minimize the danger of
both Stevens' partially perceptive vision 231 and the paternalis-
tic predilections of most men.
Brennan's majority opinion substantially incorporated
Ginsburg's suggestions. He established an "inaccurate proxy"
inquiry. This inquiry asks whether a statute's gender classifica-
tion actually acts as a "proxy" or substitute for some other so-
cial classification.m2 Brennan's test requires a functional
examination of the gender classification. The framing of the in-
quiry in functional terms almost dictates its conclusion. Once
an underlying functional purpose is discovered, gender usually
proves to be an inaccurate dividing line.= Moreover, the func-
tional characteristic itself will often provide a preferable gen-
der-neutral classification.2 40 Brennan recharacterized much of
the case law in terms of this new test, concluding that
In light of the weak congruence between gender and the
characteristic or trait that gender purported to represent, it
was necessary that the legislatures choose either to realign
their substantive laws in a gender-neutral fashion, or to
236. Id. at 21-23.
237. See supra notes 213-17 and accompanying text.
238. Boren, 429 U.S. 188-89.
239. Id.
240. In Boren, the state asserted that gender was being used as a "proxy for
drinking and driving," 429 U.S. at 201-02. The state sought to decrease the
amount of drunk driving by forbidding males aged 18-21 from purchasing 3.211
beer. At trial, the state introduced statistics to demonstrate that men drink
and drive more than women. Brennan focused on the "fit" between maleness
and drunk driving, and found that only two percent of males in the 18-21 year
old age group were arrested for drunk driving. Id. at 201. The statute therefore
inappropriately punished 98% of all young men. Thus, gender was an inaccu-
rate place to draw the line. Brennan called this inaccuracy "an undulN tenuous
Ifit.'" Id. at 202. Brennan went on, however, to note that even where the statis-
tical correlation between gender and the functional characteristic was much
closer, the Court had struck down gender distinctions where the purpose could
be furthered by a gender-neutral distinction. Id. at 202 n.13 (discussing Reed,
Frontiero, and Weisenfeld). The inaccurate proxy test suggests that where the
use of gender as a proxy is accurate, the sex-based classification will be upheld.
The structure of the inquiry, however, makes that result unlikely. Once the
statute's functional purpose is revealed, that purpose can often be addressed in
gender-neutral fashion, and plaintiffs of either sex can usually offer sufficient
counter-examples to undermine the accuracy of the proxy. Moreover, Brennan
suggests that even where accurate, the perception of invidious discrimination




adopt procedures for identifying those instances where the
sex-centered generalization actually comported to fact.24 1
The proxy inquiry is facially neutral. As Boren suggests, the
inquiry applies to discrimination against both women and men,
and thereby avoids some of the problems of perspective that
Justice Stevens' approach manifested. Moreover, the accuracy
of the proxy does not turn on whether women are "similarly
situated" to men. Rather, Brennan's analysis turns on whether
the statute's gender proxy is germane to the purpose of classifi-
cation, or, in other words, whether a functional definition of the
class of people affected would serve the purpose as effectively
as gender.242
Thus, in Boren, Ginsburg entered a poorly argued dispute
about a trivial matter, and achieved a substantial victory for
women. Her involvement avoided a muting of the women's
rights issue in the case. Absent Ginsburg's input, the decision
might well have provided an obscure treatise on the twenty-
first amendment, or at most a Stevens-type opinion about dis-
crimination against men.243 Perhaps because of the apparently
marginal nature of the issue, Ginsburg was able to inject the
traditionally "marginal" women's viewpoint. She convinced at
241. Id. at 199. Each of the examples cited by Brennan described inaccurate as-
sumptions about women, suggesting that Brennan understood where the ulti-
mate harm falls.
242. Women must still, of course, present themselves as similarly situated to
show a statute's relative burdens or benefits, but after the initial showing they
need not prove that they are "the same as" men. They must show only that
men's notions about "what women are" are inaccurate. But cf. Michael M. v.
Superior Ct. of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 469-71 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.), and
Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 353-57 (1979) (Stewart, J.), both of which articu-
late a test that turns on whether women and men are similarly situated, or al-
ternatively, on whether the Court considers the classification demeaning to
"the affected class." In both Michael M. and Parham, the Court denied equal
protection claims because it found women and men not similarly situated with
respect to the challenged statutes. 450 U.S. at 476, 441 U.S. at 360.
This Rehnquist-Stewart test combines the problems of Stevens' approach,
see supra notes 213-17 and accompanying text, and the more general problems
of requiring assimilation into male culture. See supra notes 8, 38-57 and accom-
panying text. Insofar as the Court, under the Rehnquist-Stewart test, relies in
each case on its own judgment about which class is "affected," and whether
that class is "demeaned" by a particular law, the dangers of paternalism will
always be present.
Brennan's test avoids the worst of both dangers. It ameliorates the assimi-
lationist requirement of "similarly situated" inquiries. By presuming the un-
derlying substantive inequality of women and applying a formal, sex-neutral
inquiry informed by that presumption, it recognizes women's perspective and
condition as an imperative reason for strong sex-neutral inquiry. Thus, Bren-
nan has recognized, and to the extent possible, guarded against, his own pater-
nalism. For a somewhat different perspective, see Freedman, supra note 42.
243. See supra notes 213-17 and accompanying text.
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least some members of the Court that discrimination against
men not explicitly justified by paternalistic reasoning harms
women, at least as long as men write the laws.2 "
Brennan's new approach-heightened scrutiny with a par-
ticular focus on the use of gender as a proxy for a functional
classification-marked a substantial development in sex dis-
crimination jurisprudence. While far from ideal,245 it repre-
sented a subtle compromise. The inquiry is formally neutral
but informed and/or motivated by an underlying recognition of
women's substantive inequality. The paternalistic predilec-
tions of a male judiciary demand formal neutrality. Women's
reality demands the substantive recognition of women's ine-
quality. Brennan's "inaccurate proxy" test attempts to recon-
cile these ultimately irreconcilable requirements.
Boren's male plaintiffs246 and their near-trivial complaints
served Ginsburg well. If, for example, the stereotype-proxy in-
quiry had been developed in a case brought by a female plain-
tiff, the Court might have felt no need to neutralize the formal
inquiry. And if defendants had been able to claim compensa-
tory treatment of women, as had so many defendants before,
the Court might have been reluctant to frame such a broad
stereotype inquiry absent specific, tangible harms to women al-
legedly protected by the statute. 24 7 The fact that a male plain-
244. See Boren, 429 U.S. at 198-99, where Brennan discusses the history of sex-
role stereotyping in the law almost exclusively in terms of its effect on women.
245. It does not, for example, take into account the problem of stereotypes that
are true, for whatever reason. See MacKinnon, supra note 6.
246. Technically, the plaintiff at the Supreme Court level was the female bar
owner, since both male plaintiffs were by then over 21. She was granted stand-
ing to assert their rights on an economic rationale-she would lose male cus-
tomers if the statute was upheld. Boren, 429 U.S. at 192-93.
247. In Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), Brennan applied the Boren intermediate
scrutiny standard and the gender proxy test to an Alabama statute that author-
ized state courts to impose alimony obligations on husbands but not on wives.
There, the state did advance a compensatory rationale, but Brennan found that
the gender proxy was inadequate no matter how reliable. Individualized hear-
ings were already required by the statute. In these hearings, the state could
also determine whether in fact the husband or wife was dependent or needy.
Id. at 281. In addition, Brennan noted the potential paternalistic dangers in
"benign" discrimination, stating that "even statutes purportedly designed to
compensate for and ameliorate the effects of past discrimination must be care-
fully tailored... [for they) carry the inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes
about the 'proper place' of women and their need for special protection." Id. at
283. Thus, using the analysis developed in Boren, the Court struck down alleg-
edly benign discrimination without a showing of tangible economic harm to wo-
men, on the explicit presumption that protective rationales harm women in
broader, but no less real, ways. Without Boren, the statute at issue in Orr
might have survived. In Orr, the Court focused on the operation of the stat-
ute's gender classification and its underlying assumptions, not on the reasona-
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tiff was complaining about discrimination against men helped
to create a potential safeguard against the Court's paternalistic
misperceptions. Ginsburg's input ensured that the formal neu-
trality rested on the reality of women's substantive experience.
The Brennan test recognized women's perspective, but also im-
plicitly recognized that the dangers of paternalism required a
male-dominated Court to maintain a formal "neutrality" in its
inquiry. Thus, Brennan accepted women's perspective and
questioned his own, effectively granting women a presumption
that the ultimate harm of male-imposed differentiation falls on
them.
G. Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan-A
Woman Speaks
Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion in Mississippi
University for Women v. Hogan,24 8 marking the first time that a
woman has spoken from the Supreme Court on the issue of sex
discrimination. 4 In Hogan, the Court addressed the question
of sex-segregated education. Joseph Hogan challenged a policy
of the Mississippi University for Woman that denied men ad-
mission to the University's School of Nursing.250 In an opinion
carefully and explicitly limited to the facts and circumstances
of the case, the Court found this exclusion unconstitutional.25 1
bleness of the protective rationale (which the Court accepted as a legitimate
government interest). Thus, Boren, as applied in Orr, offers a stronger mode of
analysis for benign discrimination rationales than the Social Security cases' fo-
cus on tangible economic harms. See also Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89
(1979), where the Court invalidated a provision in the Aid to Families With De-
pendent Children program which provided benefits to a family when the father
was unemployed, but not when the mother was unemployed. Justice Black-
mun, writing for the majority, concluded that the gender classification was
based on the sexual stereotype that the male is always the breadwinner, and
was also not substantially related to any valid statutory goals.
248. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
249. Ginsburg's considerable impact, detailed above, had to be filtered not only
through numerous male plaintiffs, but also through nine male Justices.
Whether the addition of a solitary woman to the Court will ultimately make a
significant difference in sex discrimination law can and should be doubted. The
least of the reasons for such doubt is Justice O'Connor's political position.
More important, certainly, is the legacy of centuries of man-made law and lan-
guage, institutionalized in the Court's procedures, carried forward with the
weight of precedent, and internalized in us all, men and women alike. In addi-
tion, O'Connor is still obviously outnumbered, and can only speak for the Court
when at least four men allow her to do so. Finally, there is the possibility that
the ideal of neutrality and men's suspicion will drive O'Connor to be especially
tough and "objective" on issues affecting women. Nevertheless, some hope can
be gained from the following reading of O'Connor's opinion in Hogan.
250. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 720-21.
251. Id. at 727-33.
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The Court left largely undecided the question of sex-segregated
education per se.25
2
Unlike the cases discussed above, the Court in Hogan
heard a wide representation of women's interests. The ACLU
was of counsel from the suit's inception,253 and two politically
distinct groups of women filed amicus briefs. Several women's
rights groups argued in a joint amicus brief that the exclusion
was unconstitutional in the context of this nursing school.254
The Mississippi University for Women Alumnae Association
voiced a quite different women's viewpoint, calling on the Court
to recognize women's right to education in a single-sex
environment.
255
Resolving the question of sex-segregated education re-
quires recognition of the asymmetry of gender classifications.
A woman-centered perspective sees many legitimate reasons
for women-only institutions, but little justification for men-only
institutions. Women have been excluded from and silenced in
all social spheres: a women-only education may allow them to
develop relatively free of the imposition of such disabling si-
lence. A women's university can offer women same-sex role
models, still rare at many coeducational colleges. Moreover,
the woman-centered university can recognize and affirm wo-
men's positive difference in a way that man-centered (i.e., coed-
ucational and men-only) institutions cannot.25 6 Men-only
education, on the other hand, can claim none of these justifica-
tions. Men have not been excluded or silenced, male role mod-
els are virtually omnipresent, and men's positive difference
from women has been celebrated for centuries.
Thus, resolution of the sex-segregated education question
requires recognition of women's substantive differences. Such
recognition, however, from the male perspective, has always
been paternalistic. A male perspective of women's difference
threatens to perpetuate subordinating stereotypes. The tradi-
252. Id. at 733.
253. By this time, Ginsburg had left to take a judgeship on the United States
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Ginsburg was appointed on June 18, 1980.
254. Amici Brief of National Women's Law Center, National Organization for
Women Legal Defense and Education Fund, Women's Equity Action League,
and Women's Legal Defense Fund, Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Amici Brief of Women's Rights
Groups].
255. Amicus Brief for Mississippi University for Women Alumnae Association,
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
256. See Adrienne Rich, Toward a Woman-Centered University in On Lies,
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tional and purportedly "neutral" approach, however, disregards
substantive gender inequalities, and would logically support
both men-only and women-only institutions (or neither). This
"neutral" approach also perpetuates the male perception of dif-
ference, and would allow the continuation of a practice central
to women's exclusion from all areas of the public sphere.25 7
Women who support women-only education but challenge men-
only institutions face a no-win situation when addressing a
male court.
Hogan's counsel explicitly denied that they were challeng-
ing the constitutionality of all sex-segregated education.258
Their arguments, nevertheless, attacked the Mississippi Uni-
versity for Women as a whole, putting the Court in a position to
answer broadly the question of sex-segregated education.25 9
The court of appeals, for example, held the exclusion unconsti-
tutional on dangerously broad grounds. First, the court as-
serted that "to justify gender-based discrimination in this case,
Mississippi cannot advance a reason that is based on gen-
der."2 60 Second, it reasoned that the existence of a corollary
men-only school might remedy the problem. 261 Such reasoning
is based on an assumption of pre-existing substantive equality
between the sexes. It fails to account for the asymmetry and
inequality of men's and women's situations. Applied broadly,
the court's reasoning would render all women-only institutions
constitutionally suspect.
Counsel for the University-a man-also broadly con-
strued the issue to be the constitutionality of sex-segregated
education per se. Defendant's brief asserted the by-now-famil-
iar compensatory argument, citing Supreme Court precedent
upholding protective labor laws for women.26 2 It offered exten-
257. See, e.g., the Supreme Court-approved approach taken in Vorchheimer v.
School Dist. of Philadelphia, 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975), af#'d, 430 U.S. 703 (1977)
(court upheld Philadelphia's offering of an all-male high school and an all-fe-
male high school, despite evidence that the boys' school had science offerings
superior to those at the girls' school); Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134
(D.S.C. 1970), affd, 401 U.S. 951 (1971) (court upheld state statute establishing
a women's-only college, which was set up as a liberal arts college with special
attention given to instruction in teaching, bookkeeping, typing, sewing, cooking,
and stenography).
258. Brief for Respondent at 8, Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718 (1982).
259. Id. at 5-8, 11-26.
260. Hogan v. Mississippi University for Women, 646 F.2d 1116, 1119 (5th Cir.
1981).
261. Id. at 1118-19.
262. Brief for Petitioner at 11-19, Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718 (1982). See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
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sive generalized support for women-only universities. 26 3
Plaintiff's counsel narrowed the issue somewhat by focus-
ing exclusively on the Mississippi University for Women. They
questioned the sincerity and effectiveness of the state's as-
serted protective purpose by referring to the University's en-
abling charter, which reflected an archaic notion of women's
place.2 64 Plaintiff's brief set Mississippi's alleged "compensa-
tory" purpose within the context of a history of state laws that
reflected stereotypical notions about women.265 It noted the
current University's male-dominated administration and senior
faculty, its gender-stereotyped curriculum, and its policy of al-
lowing men to audit classes. 260 Doctrinally, plaintiff offered the
Brennan rationale for heightened scrutiny even where men are
the nominal complainants. 26 7 Plaintiffs brief reflected a sub-
stantive understanding that women's interests were at stake.
Unfortunately, the breadth of the attack overlooked the dan-
gers of the Court's male perspective.
The amici curiae, all of which were women's groups,
presented two divergent female perspectives. The University's
alumnae association, represented by the same man who repre-
sented the University, presented one perspective. The associa-
tion supported the exclusion of men based on two notions of
women's difference:
263. Brief for Petitioner at 12-19, Hogan,.
264. ITjhe establishment and maintenance of a first-class Industrial In-
stitute and College for the education of white girls on the State of
Mississippi, in the arts and sciences, at which such girls may ac-
quire a thorough normal school education, together with a knowl-
edge of kindergarten instruction, also a knowledge of telegraphy,
stenography and photography; also a knowledge of drawing, paint-
ing, designing, and engraving in their industrial application; also a
knowledge of fancy, practical and general needlework - and also. a
knowledge of bookkeeping, with such other practical industries as,
from time to time, to them may be suggested by experience; or
tend to promote the general object of said Institute and College. to-
wit: fitting and preparing such girls for the practical industries of
the age.
Brief for Respondent at 12-13, Hogan.
265. Id. at 15-17.
266. Id. at 18-21.
267. That MUW's policy on its face disfavors men and not women
makes no difference. Many statutes which purport to favor women
are based on and perpetuate the kinds of 'old notions' and 'archaic
and overbroad generalizations' about women which this Court has
repeatedly condemned. Further, all gender-based discriminations
'carry the inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the
"proper place" of women and their needs for special protection.'
Accordingly, these principles apply whether the classification




(1) "women are 'biologically' and psychologically different
from men and thus require somewhat different approaches
to such experiences as education," and
(2) "in the aspect of life known as courtship or mate-pair-
ing, the American female remains in the role of the pursued
sex expected to adorn and groom herself to attract the
male.,,2
68
Both statements reflect a man's point of view; although the first
notion might be interpreted as either feminist or paternalistic,
the second resolves all doubts. The association asked that wo-
men-only education be upheld as a reasonable accommodation
of such sex differences.269
The women's rights groups that jointly filed an amicus
brief for the opposite side presented another perspective. They
expressed concern for the paternalism inherent in the recogni-
tion of differences as characterized by the alumae associa-
tion.270 They narrowed the focus considerably, and
concentrated the Court's attention exclusively on the School of
Nursing.271 With this approach, the issue became not the provi-
sion of education for women only, but the provision of sex-seg-
regated nursing training. In this light, Brennan's inquiry into
stereotypes takes on greater relevance, because nursing has
long been labeled a "woman's profession."2n  The women's
rights groups argued that where the state offers a compensa-
tory rationale for a classification that reinforces sex-role stereo-
types, the Court must examine the rationale especially
closely.
2 7 3
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion, joined by Brennan,
Marshall, White, and Stevens, adopted the narrow focus urged
by the women's rights groups,274 and held Hogan's exclusion on
the basis of sex unconstitutionaL 75 O'Connor reaffirmed the
heightened scrutiny standard introduced in Boren and insisted
that it must apply equally to discrimination against males and
females. 276 She strongly rejected the dissenters' attempt to ap-
ply a watered-down version of the Boren test where they ap-
268. Brief of Mississippi University for Women Alumnae Assoc. as Amicus Cu-
riae at 2-3, Hogan.
269. Id. at 2-4.
270. Amici Brief of Women's Rights Groups, supra note 254, at 26-33.
271. Id. at 8.
272. Id. at 9, 20-21.
273. Id.
274. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 722 n.7.
275. Id. at 733.
276. Id. at 723-27.
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prove of the state's objective.2 7 This rejection suggested a
recognition of the necessity, given a male-dominated Court, of
establishing and maintaining a formally "neutral" test, in-
formed by an understanding of women's condition.
O'Connor's restatement of the Boren analysis demon-
strated a sensitivity to the paradox of men deciding women's
rights. At the outset, she warned of the limitations of an
unquestioning male perspective: "Although the test ... is
straightforward, it must be applied free of fixed notions con-
cerning the roles and abilities of males and females." 278
O'Connor's opinion delineated two levels of inquiry. At the
first level, O'Connor examined the statutory objective and em-
phasized the dangers of "benign" discrimination: " If the stat-
utory objective is to exclude or 'protect' members of one gender
because they are presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap
or to be innately inferior, the objective itself is illegitimate." 279
In a footnote, O'Connor implicitly criticized earlier Supreme
Court decisions that had upheld protective labor laws applied
to women, thereby alerting the Court to its own past
paternalism.280
At the second level of inquiry-whether there was a "di-
rect, substantial relationship between objective and
means" L--O'Connor again warned of the Court's male per-
spective. The purpose of the second level, she explained, was
to guard against the "mechanical application of traditional,
often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men
and women." 282 O'Connor's addition of "often" suggests an un-
derstanding that the harm that results from stereotype-moti-
vated reasoning does not necessarily turn on inaccuracy, but
may inhere in sex-role stereotyping per se, accurate or inaccu-
rate. Having thereby implied a broader notion of stereotypes
than the Court had previously proclaimed, O'Connor concluded
by invoking the proxy analysis of Boren.283 Throughout,
O'Connor phrased her restatement of Brennan's test in gender-
neutral terms. Her warnings to her male peers, however, sug-
gested an implicit recognition of the substantive inequality of
277. Id. at 724 n.9.
278. Id. at 724-25.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 725 n.10.
281. Id. at 725.





The Court found that the state had failed to show that its
allegedly compensatory purpose was genuine, or that the
means used substantially furthered the alleged purpose.28 5
O'Connor emphasized that the state bears the burden of show-
ing actual compensatory intent. 8 In Hogan, there was strong
evidence to the contrary, including the University's charter,
which the Court cited in full in its first footnote.287 O'Connor
noted that since women already dominate the field of nursing,
the state's purpose in segregating the nursing school could not
have been compensatory. 2"8 She speculated that the policy
may in fact harm women, because it perpetuates the stereotype
and reality of nursing as a woman's job, thereby indirectly de-
pressing nurses' wages.289 Finally, she found that the testi-
mony that the University's practice of admitting male auditors
had no affect on women's performance "fatally undermine[da"
their claim that female students required protection from the
presence of men.29 0
O'Connor's opinion in Hogan furthered the cause of wo-
men's rights, while carefully guarding against paternal excess.
By striking down the statute on the narrowest possible grounds
and thereby bringing to light the statute's underlying stereo-
types, O'Connor's opinion manifested an understanding of the
importance of challenging unquestioned perspectives of differ-
ence. At the same time, by limiting the holding to nursing
schools,291 she restrained the Court from broadly imposing as-
similationist notions of sameness.292
284. O'Connor's opinion does not itself rest explicitly on the history of society's
subordination of women, and it may be that her reading represents a concep-
tion that since men and women are substantially equal already, the laws
should treat them equally. O'Connor's restatement, however, incorporates
Brennan's test wholly, and his test does rest upon a recognition of women's
subordinate status. See supra notes 240-44 and accompanying text. Moreover,
O'Connor's criticisms of judicial precedent and her warnings about paternalism
suggest at least an implicit understanding of where most of the blame lies.
285. Id. at 727.
286. Id. at 730, 730 n.16.
287. Id. at 720 n.l.
288. Id. at 729.
289. Id. at 729-30 n.15.
290. Id. at 730.
291. Id. at 719, 733.
292. Some members of the Court are, not surprisingly, blind to O'Connor's ap-
parent sensitivity. As noted in the introduction to this article, both Blackmun
and Powell wrote stinging dissents warning of "needless conformity." Id. at
733-35 (Blackmun, 3, dissenting); 735-39 (Powell, J., dissenting). Both dissents
misread the holding as broader than it is, and then go on to praise the virtues
of sex-segregated education and "diversity." Id. at 734, 739-40. Powell's dissent
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With respect to the gender of its participants, Hogan
played several reversals on the larger social scheme. A woman
wrote the Court's opinion, and women's voices were heard on
both sides during argument. That the case was brought by a
man challenging his exclusion from a women-only institution is
itself a reversal of more common problems in sex discrimina-
tion. Men's exclusion from women's sphere is rare, and where
it exists, it rarely needs enforcement. Any preconceived no-
tions about the centrality of men and the marginality of women
were therefore thoroughly undermined at the level of court-
room exchange. Faced with both a man and woman who
claimed to be "different" from their assigned gender roles, the
Court struck down a sex classification based on stereotyped
sex-role assignments. The articulation of non-traditional differ-
ence came from both genders, and the Court sought to accom-
modate those differences.
III. Conclusion
If nothing else, the cases presented above should demon-
strate that the perspectives of women and men are radically
different. The problem, of course, is what to make of such dif-
ference, and more importantly, who decides what to make of
such difference. From the traditional male perspective, which
insists on its own "objectivity," women's difference invites con-
descension and paternalism. By virtue of men's notions about
"their difference," women have been excluded, silenced,
demeaned, put on pedestals and placed in cages, objectified
and acted upon, all in the name of "protection." When men,
however, have failed to recognize women's differences, their
definitions of equality and justice have been male-centered
rather than generic. For example, traditional notions of equal-
ity in workplaces outside the home, which developed when
many women were still restricted to the home, disregard wo-
men's particular needs with respect to pregnancy and
childbearing. In law, as in language, the generic has been de-
fined and appropriated by men.29
also misconstrues the harm, ignoring the stereotypical harms inflicted on wo-
men, claiming that the majority "hardly can claim that women are discrimi-
nated against." Id. at 745 (Powell, J., dissenting). Thus, both dissents evidence
blindness not only to the experience of women, but, once again, to the dangers
of paternalism.
293. In Old English, "man" was generic, "wer" referred to males, "wif" to fe-
males. Similarly, in Latin, "homo" was generic, "vir" was male, and "muller" or
"femina" was female. In English, males have usurped the generic, so that most
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The pursuit of women's equality requires a recognition of
gender differences that does not assign positive and negative
values to the terms "male" and "female." Such a recognition
can only truly arrive when the perspectives of women and men
have equal weight. It requires the full and active participation
of women as well as men in the structuring of social institu-
tions. Only in this manner can difference be recognized and ac-
commodated. What this suggests is that the law, given its male
history, its continuing domination by men, its paternal predi-
lections, and its tendency to translate difference into opposi-
tion, is a particularly inappropriate vehicle for the pursuit of
women's equality.
But such a conclusion is both too simple and too danger-
ous. Too dangerous, at least when reached by a man, because
it threatens to perpetuate women's exclusion and disempower-
ment, as we all too comfortably throw up our hands in impotent
dismay. Too simple, because it does not account for the gains
that have been made through law. The case history detailed
above suggests that there is a middle way between outright ex-
clusion on the one hand and paternalistic inclusion on the
other. Ginsburg sought to infuse the reigning male perspective
with a female point of view. To that end, she challenged men's
unquestioned assumptions about the nature of the "other" sex,
as well as about themselves. An analysis of her efforts sug-
gests that achieving those goals in practice is both more diffi-
cult and less impossible than theory might suggest.2 9 4
It was not enough, in Frontiero, to persuade the Court to
take judicial notice of women's history of inequality. The limi-
tations of that recognition became evident in Kahn and Bal-
lard, where the Court sustained gender-based classifications
on weakly supported paternalistic rationales. In retrospect, the
Kahn and Ballard results are not surprising. In both cases, the
Court confronted male plaintiffs who sought benefits for them-
selves, and a state that offered a rationale based on the very in-
equality that the Court had just recognized in Frontiero. In
Kahn and Ballard, the state saw what the Court had seen-wo-
men's inequality-but neither state nor Court saw that its
of our "neutral" terms are interchangeable with the male-gendered terms--e.g.,
man, chairman, doctor-but not with the female-gendered terms. See Sexist
Language: A Modern Philosophical Analysis (Mary Vetterling-Braggin ed.
1981); Casey Miller and Kate Swift, Words and Women (1976); Robin Lakoff,
Language and Women's Place (1975).
294. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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cause and purported remedy were one and the same-
paternalism.
Opening the Court's eyes to its own paternalism proved
much more difficult. The very idea of "doing justice" requires a
certain blindness to paternalism. The social security cases
were Ginsburg's initial response. By bringing before the Court
male plaintiffs tied by marriage to women, she could character-
ize any differentiation as imposing upon women a direct eco-
nomic burden. Tangible harm to members of the allegedly
protected group dramatically undermined protective rationales.
By using married or widowed male plaintiffs, Ginsburg was
able to invite, foresee, and counteract the state's "benign" ratio-
nales. The social security cases forced the Court to question its
own paternalism and demanded that remedies be framed in
functional, rather than gender-conscious, terms.
In Boren, the Court extended the doctrine of sex discrimi-
nation by calling for a heightened standard of scrutiny, neu-
trally applied, but ultimately resting on a recognition of
women's substantive inequality. The vehicle for this develop-
ment was a focus on stereotypic gender proxies. The test could
and had to be applied neutrally in order to avoid paternalism,
but its basis was a presumption that all sex-role stereotypes
harm women more than men. The Court's recent opinion in
Hogan further developed the focus on stereotypes. In that
case, Justice O'Connor phrased and applied the Boren proxy
test neutrally (to a man), but she repeatedly warned the Court
to beware of its own paternalistic blinders.
As many of these cases illustrate, the use of male plaintiffs
provides several advantages for women's rights groups in liti-
gating sex discrimination claims. First, the justices of the
Court may simply be more likely to perceive a harm to one of
their own gender. Second, male plaintiffs are often the only
ones, under present standing and ripeness doctrines, who can
challenge certain aspects of "benign" discrimination. Third, the
use of the male plaintiff is almost certain to elicit benign ratio-
nales for discrimination, no matter what his claim. To the ex-
tent that such "protective" attitudes lie at the root of sex
discrimination and are a principal reason for its obfuscation,
their uncovering, articulation, and eradication are necessary to
the pursuit of equality. Lastly, the application of a gender dis-
crimination inquiry to men forces women's groups, and the
Court, to formulate a truly neutral standard, one which defines
neutrality as required by women's substantive experience of in-
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equality. The neutrality sought is one that takes woman's differ-
ence into account without thereby subordinating her. This goal
may be furthered by the gender proxy inquiry articulated by
Brennan in Boren, insofar as it provides incentives for legisla-
tures and courts to replace gender lines with functional classifi-
cations. Whether functional classifications can be drawn
without male bias remains open to question, but the filtering of
women's interests through men's perspective requires such re-
definition if women are to approach equality.
The male plaintiff is not without disadvantages. Where
women and men are in fact different, in ways that cannot be
redefined as "similarly situated" by a more neutral conception,
a male plaintiff will be of no help. Historically, these are the
cases that women lose.2 As a practical matter, these cases
may be the most important, and not only because they involve
such significant women's issues as pregnancy and childbirth.
Irreducible differences represent the cutting edge of the prob-
lem of sexism; such differences form the bedrock for the very
conception of woman as "other."296 Development of sex dis-
crimination jurisprudence with male plaintiffs tends to avoid
these harder issues. Sexism operates by distinctions; the ques-
tion is whether gender distinctions can exist free of sexist val-
ues. In the law, which also operates by distinctions, it seems
that women's irreducible differences cannot yet be fairly
accommodated.
Kahn and Ballard demonstrate that even where men and
women are similarly situated, a male plaintiff may raise
problems of perspective. In Ballard, women were silent. In
Kahn, a male plaintiff distorted a woman-centered perspective
by filtering it through his male point of view. Women's amicus
briefs can break the silence. But distortion is a much more in-
tractable problem. Substitution of female plaintiffs offers no
simple solution, for the distortion of the male perspective per-
vades our legal culture.
The history and theory of modern American and French
feminism suggest that society can recognize gender differences
without disparagement only when women participate fully in
the act of recognition. The insinuation of women's perspective
via "similarly situated" arguments can broaden the Court's
perspective, but it may be that a true non-hierarchical recogni-
tion of difference requires, finally, a Court composed equally of
295. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
296. See aupra note 26.
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women and men. Unfortunately, the path to equal participa-
tion in making and administering the law is through the law,
short of revolution. 97 The task, then, is to question and rede-
fine our notions of equality and our definitions of "similarly sit-
uated," with a view toward increasing women's access to the
public sphere. The catch, of course, is that such redefinitions
require the active participation of women. Thus, access must
have already been achieved before we can redefine rules in or-
der to create access. As troubling as this circularity is-and the
foregoing history demonstrates only some of the difficulties-
the circle of male insularity has been broken. Women are
speaking. It is imperative that we all listen. Such an effort re-
quires a vigilant self-consciousness on the part of male judges,
lawyers, writers, and readers-a self-consciousness which does
not take our objectivity for granted, which listens to and invites
difference, and which defers to those who have for so long de-
ferred to us. Only when women and men participate equally in
the law will the law be able to see, as women have come to see,
that men are just as different from women as women are differ-
ent from men.
297. Far be it from me to preclude the latter path. See, e.g., Women and
Revolution (Lydia Sargent ed. 1981).
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